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Abstract
This thesis presents three empirical essays related to liquidity, employment and
investment. The first two essays evaluate the consequences of the largest public
liquidity injection to the corporate sector in Spanish history. The first essay evaluates
the consequences of this public program on the corporate behavior of firms and the
second essay evaluates its impact on aggregate employment. The third essay
characterizes the rise in importance of cross-listed securities and its implications for
diversification across industries and countries.
Esta tesis presenta tres ensayos emp´ıricos relacionados con liquidez, empleo e
inversio´n. Los dos primeros ensayos analizan las consecuencias de la mayor inyeccio´n
de liquidez pu´blica al sector empresarial en la historia de Espan˜a. El primer ensayo
analiza las consecuencias de este programa pu´blico en el comportamiento de las
empresas y el segundo ensayo analiza su impacto en el empleo agregado. El tercer
ensayo describe el aumento de la importancia de las acciones “cross-listed” y sus
implicaciones para la diversificacio´n entre pa´ıses e industrias.
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1 Introduction
After the global financial crisis that was initiated in the last decade, Spain has not
been able yet, to recover from a strong recession. The country has been experiencing
a strong credit crunch and the Spanish government has undertaken many measures to
overcome its dreadful consequences. The Spanish financial system experienced a strong
restructuring process and many financial institutions were bailed out. Moreover, the
Spanish government conducted the largest liquidity injection to the corporate sector in
Spanish history. In 2012, over 30 billion euros were injected directly to firms through
the FFPS (Fund for the Financing of Payments to Suppliers). Spain represents an ideal
setting to study the consequences of a public liquidity injection when the banking sector
is unable to satisfy the financing needs of the corporate sector.
In the first essay entitled “Liquidity provision: lessons from a natural experiment”
(co-authored with Jose Maria Abad), we assess the economic impact of the FFPS plan
on firms’ investment and financing decisions. More than 60,000 firms in Spain received
more than 30 billion euros, a figure approximately equivalent to 3% of Spanish GDP. At
that time, the Spanish economy was undergoing a strong credit crunch originated by the
global financial crisis. In this setting, injecting liquidity to the banks was not increasing
the supply of credit to firms and governmental direct cash transfers to firms seemed an
interesting unorthodox stimulus policy. We assess the economic impact of the plan using
two alternative estimation strategies. First, we use a differences-in-differences (DID)
approach that exploits heterogeneity in the size of the liquidity received by firms. Second,
we take advantage of the plan’s plausibly exogenous disbursement implementation and
run a DID using as control group some firms that were paid a year later. Overall, we
find a positive and significant reaction of corporate investment to the liquidity shock:
on average firms use 4% of cash transfers for investment. This effect is stronger for firms
with lower default risk and higher investment opportunities. Firms with higher default
risk are more prone to repay financial debt. On average, firms use 8% of cash transfers
to repay financial debt.
In the second essay entitled “How does easing liquidity constraints affect aggregate
employment?” (co-authored with Jose Maria Abad and Rodolfo G. Campos), we again
exploit the FFPS database to measure the impact of removing liquidity constraints on
aggregate employment. We identify the effect on employment from the cross-sectional
variation in the size of the liquidity shock to which the Spanish municipalities were
exposed, and from how municipalities fared before and after the liquidity injection.
Our findings indicate that the municipality where firms are located exhibits a stronger
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labor market response than the municipality where the liquidity injection originates.
This result provides interesting insights on how firms’ internal decisions can change the
impact of government policies.
Finally, the third essay examines the role of cross-listed stocks in the diversification
decisions of investors. “Do cross-listings substitute for international diversification?”
(co-authored with Jose´ Manuel Campa and Rodolfo G. Campos), characterizes the rise
in importance of cross-listed securities and its implications for diversification across
industries and countries. We document a substantial increase in the number of stocks
that are cross-listed and the relative market value of these types of securities. The rise
in cross-listed stocks has allowed investors to diversify internationally from home by
investing in these cross-listed stocks. The higher prevalence of cross-listing has been a
driving force in the increase of the importance of industry effects relative to country
effects. Thus, investment in a portfolio that includes cross-listed securities is an effective
way to substitute for international diversification strategies.
2
2 Liquidity Provision: Lessons form a
Natural Experiment
2.1 Introduction
In a recession, where should the government inject liquidity to foster investment and
economic growth? To which extent does relaxing firms’ financial constraints increase
investment? Does this relation depend on firms’ growth opportunities, debt maturity,
or market conditions? The goal of this paper is to answer these questions with a clean
causal identification strategy. We exploit a natural experiment that occurred in the
biggest liquidity injection to the corporate sector in Spanish history. In particular, we
evaluate the effectiveness of a liquidity injection program conducted by the Spanish
government through the Fund for Financing Payments to Suppliers (FFPS). The
program was introduced to expand economic activity and to overcome the strong
recession that Spain was suffering. Spain was undergoing a strong credit crunch in
2012 and the government injected almost 30bn euros to alleviate firms’ credit
constraints and stimulate economic growth.
The crisis represented a negative shock to the supply of external finance for firms and
this induced a decline of corporate investment (Duchin et al., 2010). In this setting, it
is of great importance to determine the best way to channel liquidity into the economy
to foster investment. Prior research has shown that reduced bank liquidity causes a
reduction of credit supply to firms (Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), Santos (2010) or
Iyer et al. (2013)). In an attempt to alleviate banks’ liquidity constraints, in 2009
the Spanish government created the Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring (FROB), a
program designed to bailout and reconstruct the Spanish financial system. After several
bailouts, Spain received almost 39bn euros for bank recapitalization from the European
Financial Stability Facility in 2012. Bank recapitalization and the effects of monetary
policy have been widely studied (Ashcraft et al. (2011), or Diamond and Rajan (2011)),
and precautionary hoarding and reluctance of banks to lend during a crisis have been
evidenced. This was the case in Spain, where the credit crunch was especially severe
and despite the large liquidity injection that Spanish banks received, access to finance
was reported as the most pressing problem by almost 30% of the firms interviewed in a
study by the European Central Bank (2014).
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It is in this setting that the Spanish government introduced the FFPS program as an
alternative and direct channel of liquidity to firms. Substantial literature has studied the
effect of public spending on the real economy, and in particular on private investment,
but results are far from being conclusive and have never been focused in recessionary
periods (Barro (1981), Blanchard and Perotti (2002) or Kim and Nguyen (2014)). The
case of Spain seems an ideal setting to study the potential impact of unorthodox stimulus
policies during a recession when firms experience a serious shortage of credit supply.
We find that the plan was successful in stimulating investment. In particular, we
find strong empirical evidence of a positive and significant relationship between liquidity
and investment, which we claim is evidence of the effectiveness of the plan in alleviating
the financial constrains caused by the credit crunch. Firms dedicated on average 4% of
the cash received (1.1bn euros) to increase long-term investment.1 This effect is stronger
for firms with lower default risk and higher investment opportunities. Firms with higher
default risk and lower investment opportunities are more prone to repay financial debt.
On average, firms use 8% of cash transfers to repay financial debt.
The large unexpected liquidity shock conducted by the Spanish government
(through the FFPS) in 2012 affected over 60,000 firms. In the five years prior to this
shock, Territorial Administrations (both regional and local governments) had been
accumulating arrears owed to suppliers. The volume of arrears was around 30bn euros,
a figure as big as 3% of Spanish GDP. In February and March 2012, two laws were
ratified by Parliament to set up the FFPS. The first appearance in the news of this
measure was in mid-January 2012. All payments to suppliers were done in May/July
2012 through a cash transfer managed by the Spanish Official Credit Institute
(ICO).
Our empirical strategy relies on the fact that the announcement and occurrence of
the liquidity shock is confined to the short period between January and July 2012.
Therefore, in December 2011 this shock was completely unexpected by any firm, and
by December 2012 all firms had received the cash at least five months before. We use
end of year financial data of the firms and have information from December 2007 up to
December 2013. We use two methodologies, a DID approach that exploits
heterogeneity in the size of the liquidity received by firms and a DID using as control
group some firms that were paid a year later due to the plan’s exogenous disbursement
implementation. For both methodologies we use matching techniques to make the
groups more comparable, although in the second methodology we show that firms are
already very similar on observables.
Suppliers that worked for groups of municipalities (mancomunidades) that
authorities had overlooked in the laws passed in 2012 received the payment of their
1Our estimates are relative to a control group, so these numbers must be interpreted as an increase in
investment relative to our control group. This does not necessarily imply a net increase in investment
if the control group reduces investment.
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arrears a year later. These suppliers were paid in a second phase, together with other
suppliers whose invoices were also not adequately processed in 2012. In total, more
than 7,000 firms (representing arrears amounting to around 1bn euros) were paid in
this second phase in 2013. We use this event as a refinement to contrast our main
findings. We use the firms in phase 2 as our control group and study the impact of the
liquidity shock of 2012 on the firms in phase 1. The advantage of using firms in phase
2 as our control group, is their resemblance in their characteristics to those in phase 1,
and that they receive the shock a year later for exogenous reasons. By using these
firms, we also control for potential endogeneity that arises from the specificities of
firms that work for the public sector. In addition, we conduct our analysis with and
without a matching strategy since the initial resemblance is not perfect and to avoid
any biases originated from omitted variables.
Our study also contributes to the long-standing debate on the impact of firm’s
financial constraints on investment. There has traditionally been broad interest in the
economic and financial literature on how financial frictions affect investment (Fazzari
et al. (1988), Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Rauh (2006), Chen and Chen (2012) or
Banerjee and Duflo (2014)). However, there is still no clear evidence on this relationship.
For example, several papers have used data from the repatriation of foreign earnings
under the American Jobs Creation Act to study the impact of changes in financial
constraints on several corporate variables. Using the same data, while Blouin and Krull
(2009) and Dharmapala et al. (2011a) find no effect on investment, Faulkender and
Petersen (2012) find a positive and significant effect on corporate investment. In another
influential paper, Rauh (2006) tries to identify the dependence of corporate investment
on firm financial constraints. However, his work has been criticized due to his empirical
specification: Rauh (2006) employs a regression discontinuity design, exploiting sharply
nonlinear funding rules for defined benefit pension plans, and according to Bakke and
Whited (2012), his results seem to arise from the use of a small fraction of the sample
observations that have specific characteristics.
Our paper adds to the existing estimates of the effect of cash flows on investment
through the use of a unique data set and a clean causal identification strategy. Correct
identification of the causal effect of cash flows on investment is a challenge because both
variables are co-determined in equilibrium. However, the natural experiment allows us
to correctly disentangle the causality of the liquidity injection on investment. Spain is
an ideal laboratory to test this puzzle because of the severe financial constraints that
firms suffered during the Great Recession, as documented by Bentolila et al. (2013),
Jimenez et al. (2014) or Bermejo et al. (2015). Jimenez et al. (2014) and Bentolila
et al. (2013) use Spanish data on loan applications and grants from the Credit Register
of the Banco de Espan˜a (CIR) to disentangle the effects of credit supply and credit
demand. Both papers show evidence in favor of a credit supply shock. The former
finds that lower GDP growth caused a reduction in loan granting. They claim that this
is especially relevant for a country like Spain, where most firms are bank dependent
and bank substitution is difficult for constrained firms. The latter finds that the strong
5
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decrease of credit supply in Spain had negative effects on the real economy (they focus
in the labor market effect). Interestingly, the FFPS program was precisely designed to
alleviate firms’ financial constraints, reduce corporate indebtedness, and foster economic
growth. Therefore, it is a unique setting to study the impact of a liquidity shock on
financially constrained firms.
Our data also allows us to determine whether the relation between investment
and financial constraints depends on firms’ characteristics. This has important policy
implications, as government interventions could have different economic impact if they
are channeled to different types of firms. We focus our analysis in the vast literature
that analyzes the relationship between capital structure, growth opportunities and firm
investment. Modigliani and Miller (1958) state that, under certain assumptions, the
capital structure of the firm is irrelevant and that any firm with positive net present
value investment opportunities would obtain funding to undertake them. Subsequently,
many papers have stressed a negative relationship between leverage and investment when
these assumptions do not hold. Myers (1977), for example, shows that with sufficiently
high leverage, profitable projects can go unfunded because of the debt overhang created
by prior debt financing. This effect has been commonly called the “underinvestment”
problem of debt financing and implies that debt reduces the value of firms with growth
opportunities. On the other hand, Jensen (1986)) or Stulz (1990) highlight the positive
aspects of debt on investment, especially for low-growth firms, since debt can limit
managerial discretion over free cash flows and avoid what has been called the “over-
investment” problem. In the same vein, in the literature on cash windfalls, Blanchard
et al. (1994) show that firms do increase investment when they receive a cash windfall,
by investing it in unattractive projects to avoid having outsiders with claims on this
cash. It is clear that debt has a desirable moderating effect on investment when growth
opportunities are low and “overinvestment” is plausible. However, debt and capital
market imperfections can also have a negative effect on investment when interesting
investment opportunities arise. Our research design allows us to better understand
the impact of leverage and growth opportunities on the sensitivity of investment to
liquidity.
Disentangling the effect of leverage and growth opportunities from the causal
relation between liquidity and investment is challenging because liquidity, growth
opportunities, leverage, and cash are jointly co-determined. By exploiting the
unexpectedness of the liquidity shock received by the firms in 2012, and measuring
growth opportunities and leverage prior to the shock, we observe their differential
impact on the sensitivity of investment to liquidity. Moreover, we avoid additional
sources of potential endogeneity that will be discussed later by exploiting the data
from phase 2. In particular, we find that more leveraged firms use the liquidity
received to repay debt, and that the firms that are more likely to invest are those with
lower debt and greater growth opportunities. Banerjee and Duflo (2014) use variation
in a targeted lending program to estimate whether firms are credit constrained.
Contrary to our findings, they state that only constrained firms will use cash to expand
6
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production while unconstrained firms would use it as a substitute for other borrowing.
However, they study firms in a unique industry (manufacturing), in a developing
country (India), and in a setting with very different market conditions. We are aware
that our results are specific for recessionary environments where credit supply shortage
affects the corporate sector.
Our paper is also closely related to papers that study the differential effect of
liquidity risk on short and long-term investment, and their impact on economic growth
along the business cycle. Procyclicality theories argue that in a credit crunch,
constrained firms are more concerned about the liquidity risk of long-term investments
and reduce these investments in favor of more liquid short-term investments.
Long-term investment has higher liquidity risk and thus firms with higher liquidity
constraints are likely to reduce long-term investments. This effect is stronger in
recessions, when liquidity is expected to be scarce. Aghion et al. (2012) show that
R&D investment is countercyclical without credit constraints, but it becomes
procyclical as firms face tighter credit constraints.
In our analysis, we focus on long-term investment. Long-term investment enhances
productivity growth more than short-term investment (Aghion et al., 2010), it increases
long-term economic growth and it is key to recover from a financial crisis (Garicano and
Steinwender, 2014). We find that less indebted firms with higher growth opportunities
exhibit a greater propensity to invest when they receive the liquidity injection. Our
results are in line with those of Garicano and Steinwender (2014) who introduce a novel
measure of credit shocks by observing the change from long-term investments to short-
term investments of financially constrained firms. They find that firms prefer short-
term investments that yield short-term cash flows since they want to mitigate the risk
of being liquidated due to lack of access to cash. Our paper complements their paper:
we empirically show a significant and different reaction of firms with heterogeneous
probabilities of default when credit constraints are alleviated. We measure whether
there is a significant reaction to a liquidity shock and study what firms actually do
with the cash. As documented by Garicano and Steinwender (2014), reducing long-term
investment impedes recovery from the financial crisis and reduces long-term economic
growth. From a policy point of view, our results are key to determine which firms should
the government target with a liquidity injection to increase long-term investment and
foster economic growth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we provide background
information on the institutional setting in which the shock takes place. Section 2.3
describes the data used for the analysis and the construction of some relevant variables.
The empirical strategy and summary statistics are shown in Section 2.4. Section 2.5
reports the results and Section 2.6 concludes.
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2.2 Institutional Setting
The Spanish economy suffered a strong credit crunch originated by the financial crisis
that burst in 2008 (Bentolila et al. (2013), Jimenez et al. (2014) and Bermejo et al.
(2015)). The financial crisis had a substantive impact on the Spanish private sector,
leading to higher unemployment and depressed domestic demand (Campos and Reggio,
2015a). The public sector was not left unscathed. Spain’s public administrations,
particularly at the sub-national level, experienced funding problems in the capital
markets, just like local banks, and they also delayed payments to suppliers. The result
was that, as of December 2011, the commercial debt accumulated by regional and local
governments amounted almost to 30bn euros (almost 3% of GDP). This situation was
creating a vicious circle: while mitigating the financial constraints of regional and local
governments, it was augmenting the financial constraints that firms were already
experiencing and hindering their recovery.
Therefore, aiming to address the liquidity problems faced by suppliers of regional
and local governments, the Spanish government set up a new State-owned vehicle, the
FFPS, through two Royal Decrees passed in 2012, February 24 and March 9.
On the asset side, the FFPS made payments directly to the suppliers of regional
and local governments, subrogating itself in their position as claimants against these
territorial administrations. As a result, commercial debt previously held by suppliers
turned into financial debt in the hands of the FFPS. Interestingly, while participation by
the 8,000 Spanish local authorities was mandatory, participation by the 17 regions was
voluntary; and actually 3 of them (Basque Country, Galicia and Navarra) decided not
to participate. Payments were made on three different dates: on May 28, 9.3bn euros
were transferred directly to the suppliers of the 8,000 local governments; on June 25,
17.7bn euros were transferred directly to the suppliers of the 14 participating regions;
and finally, on July 30, 0.3bn euros were transferred to the suppliers of local governments
that had been left behind in the May payment. Overall, in just three bank transfers
made in three different dates within a period of just two months, the ICO (the FFPS’
paying agent) injected an amount of cash worth 27.3bn euros in the real economy.
Importantly, funding provided by the FFPS to the regional and local governments
was guaranteed through the retention of their share of State tax receipts. Funding costs
for regional and local governments equaled the Spanish Treasury’s funding cost plus a
maximum margin of 115 basis points to which a maximum mediation margin of 30 basis
points was also added. These were quite favorable conditions compared to what regional
and local governments could actually get by themselves in the capital markets. In order
to avoid moral hazard, regional and local governments were required to submit a fiscal
adjustment program to the Central Government. While regional and local governments
complying with this requirement enjoyed funding with a maturity of 10 years with a
2-year interest-only grace period, funding provided to regional and local governments
8
2 Liquidity Provision: Lessons form a Natural Experiment
failing to meet this requirement was deducted from their share of State tax receipts over
a 5-year period.
On the liability side, the FFPS gathered funds from a 30bn euros (maximum up
to 35bn euros) syndicated loan granted by a pool of most of the Spanish banks. Given
the State-owned nature of the FFPS, the syndicated loan was guaranteed by the State,
making it attractive for participating banks. At the same time, however, all FFPS’
liabilities became part of the central Government debt.
2.2.1 The second phase
In February 2013, another Royal Decree Law was ratified resulting in a new round (phase
2) of the FFPS. It was approved to pay the arrears to the suppliers of certain groups
of municipalities (mancomunidades), a different sub-national entity that authorities had
left behind in the laws passed in 2012, as well as claims which did not qualify in the
2012 payments due to different political reasons. Again, ICO transferred around 1bn
euros to suppliers of regional and local governments.
The important fact for our analysis, is that the reason why some firms participated
in this new phase was a matter of the slack of the laws passed in the first phase (they did
not include mancomunidades) and political issues independent of the characteristics of
the suppliers. In fact, not only were firms in both phases very similar in characteristics,
but many of the suppliers in phase 2 also participated in phase 1. However, we conduct
a matching procedure since we do find that firms that exclusively received funds in phase
2 are smaller from those of phase 1. Importantly, while payments by the FFPS extended
over a 3-year window (2012-14), data exploited was restricted to the first 2 years (2012-
13) since we need a window after the shock to capture the consequences of the liquidity
injection.
Data from regions and municipalities is heterogeneous: this data shows significant
heterogeneity in the payment behavior and financial strength of different regions and
municipalities. This can lead to an endogenous relation of the suppliers that contract
with different administrations, and thus must be taken care of. In our main analysis, we
include geographical fixed effects to account for this heterogeneity, and in some cases we
also control for the financial health of regions and municipalities.
2.3 Data and Sample
In this section we describe the data. All our data has annual frequency. Moreover, we
also explain the construction of some variables used for our analysis.
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We exploit a data set constructed by the Spanish Official Credit Institute (ICO).
The ICO data set includes anonymous firm information from different phases of the
FFPS and exhaustive firm-level data from the Iberian Balance Sheet Analysis System
(SABI),2. Initially, in the first phase, the ICO data set includes anonymous information
for firms accounting for 48.2% of all suppliers that benefited from the FFPS (64,879 out
of 134,568) and almost 70% of the funds injected (19bn euros out of 27.3bn euros).3 The
data set includes information on the number and amount of unpaid bills that each firm
has with each regional and local government, the amounts seized by the government
due to unpaid taxes and social contributions and the dates in which the payments took
place. The difference between the amount of unpaid bills and the seized amount equals
the cash the firm effectively receives.
Interestingly, the ICO data set matches the information from the FFPS to SABI, a
database with a coverage of more than 1.25 million firms in Spain. SABI data includes
corporate accounting information, sector, number of employees, cash flow information
and investment information. ICO’s data set does not include information on 46,564
self-employed individuals (34.6% of suppliers and 1.5% of funds), nor on 23,125 firms
(17.2% of suppliers and 29% of funds) that were not available in SABI.
Regarding the data from phase 2, a total of 1.14bn euros were injected to 5,070
firms. The ICO data set includes 1,848 firms, from which 1,201 are firms that already
received funds in phase 1 (total amount of 259mn euros and average bill of 216,000
euros), and 647 are firms that only receive funds in phase 2 (total amount of roughly
80mn euros and average bill of 120,000 euros).
ICO obtained all the credit rating and probability of default data from a special
financial strength indicator module available through SABI and provided by
ModeFinance.4 This data is an assessment of the creditworthiness of a company and it
is based on a snapshot of the financial health of the company. These ratings are also
provided on an annual frequency.
We obtain data on aggregate amounts of arrears and accounting information of
counties and regions from the Spanish Ministry of Economy database.
Finally, we obtain from the Spanish Tax Agency the dates of each unpaid invoice.
This information is useful to account for the unexpectedness of the liquidity shock.
In our analysis, we exclude financial firms, which means that a total of 156 firms are
dropped from the FFPS sample. Moreover, we also drop firms that have no information
on total assets.5 We restrict our sample of treated and untreated observations to those
2SABI data is provided by INFORMA D&B in collaboration with Bureau Van Dijk
3Information on self-employed individuals and firms not covered in SABI (mainly financial firms and
very small companies) is lost.
4ModeFinance is a data vendor that creates and develops a credit risk assessment methodology called
MORE (Multi Objective Rating Evaluation)
5This implies that roughly 10.000 additional firms are dropped.
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that have observations on all the matching covariates in the four years of our analysis.6
Matching covariates are the same for all our regressions, so the sample is homogenous
and results are comparable. By following this approach, we are aware that we are
creating a survival bias, but we avoid an entry/exit bias whose consequences are far
more unpredictable.
2.3.1 Our dependent variables: measuring corporate investment
and short-term financial debt
We study the effect of the liquidity shock on investment and short-term financial debt.
Each of these dependent variables is measured in a similar way.
We follow Asker et al. (2014) and measure corporate investment as the annual
increase in gross fixed assets (gross property, plant and equipment) scaled by beginning-
of-year total assets. As noted by Asker et al. (2014), by using this measure, we are
capturing increase in assets due to both capital expenditures (CAPEX) and mergers and
acquisitions (M&A). Our study is primarily focused on private firms which usually do
not pay their acquisitions with stocks (due to their reduced size), so this measure seems
to be the most appropriate to accurately measure corporate investment. As mentioned
in Section 4.1, we focus on long term investment since it enhances productivity growth
more than short-term investment (Aghion et al., 2010), it increases long-term economic
growth and it is key to recover from a financial crisis (Garicano and Steinwender, 2014).
Thus, investment for any firm i is:
Investmentit = (Fixed assetsit − Fixed assetsit−1) ∗ 100/Total Assetsit−1 (2.1)
In a similar vein, in the case of short-term financial debt, we measure our variable
of interest as the annual difference in short-term financial debt scaled by beginning-of-
year total assets. Again, we multiply by 100 to scale coefficients, in order to interpret
coefficients of regressors in percentage terms.
2.3.2 Measuring the liquidity shock by firm
All the invoices with different local and regional governments are aggregated at the firm
level. Therefore, we have the total amount of arrears that each firm is paid. Information
on seized amounts by the central government are also reported in our database. Seized
amounts are due to debts that firms had with the central government. These seized
amounts are deducted from the total amount of arrears that are owed to the firm. Our
measure of the liquidity shock is the total amount of arrears minus the total amount
6Matching procedure is described in Section 2.4.1.
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seized by the government. It is therefore a measure of the effective amount of euros
transferred from ICO to the firm. We normalize the size of the liquidity shock by the
firms’ total assets in 2011. We normalize by the value in 2011 since it is the year prior
to the realization of the shock and we don’t want our measure of the liquidity shock to
be affected by the shock itself (which happens in 2012). Thus, the liquidity shock for
any firm i is:
Liquidity shocki = (Total arrearsi − Seized amountsi)/Total Assets in 2011i (2.2)
2.3.3 Measuring default risk and investment opportunities
We disentangle the differential effect of default risk and investment opportunities on the
relation between investment and the liquidity shock.
Faulkender and Petersen (2006) find that credit ratings exogenously affect a firm’s
access to financing. Our measures of credit ratings are firm-year probabilities of default.
These probabilities are ranked from 0 to 100, with 100 being the highest probability of
default.7 Moreover, we also proxy credit ratings by computing adjusted Altman Z-scores
and leverage, results are unchanged.8 We divide the sample at the median to classify
firms as having high or low default risk. We use values for 2011 to make sure they
are exogenous to the liquidity shock. Several papers, such as Almeida et al. (2004),
Campello et al. (2010) or Chang et al. (2014) have used credit ratings as proxies for
financial constraints.
Traditionally, investment opportunities have been measured using either Tobin’s q
(ratio of the firm’s market value to the book value of its assets) or sales growth. The
majority of the firms in our sample are not traded on the stock exchange. In Spain, barely
200 firms are traded, so we use sales growth to proxy for investment opportunities. This
measure has been profusely used in the literature, for example by Billett et al. (2007),
Bloom et al. (2007), Michaely and Roberts (2012) or Asker et al. (2014). For each firm,
we calculate the average sales growth for the two years previous to the shock (2010 and
2011). Subsequently, for each industry, we divide the sample at the median to classify
firms as having high or low two-year sales growth.
2.4 Empirical Strategy and Summary Statistics
To analyze the consequences of the liquidity shock on investment and short-term
financial debt, we use two differences-in-differences (DID) testing procedures.
Matching variables, controls, rules to fix outliers and regression techniques are the
7Probabilities of default are provided by ModeFinance, as previously mentioned
8Altman Z-score is measured following Altman (1968).
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same for both DID approaches and both variables of interest. In this way, results are
made comparable.
We exploit the data from the FFPS that describes the repayment of arrears that
Territorial Administrations had been accumulating. Given the specificities of firms
that work for the public sector, it is difficult to decide on an appropriate control group
to analyze the effect of this liquidity shock on investment. To avoid unobserved
heterogeneity generated by these specificities, we restrict our analysis to firms that
participated in the FFPS plan.9 We exploit the heterogeneity in the size of the
liquidity shock and use as treated firms those in the top tercile and as control group
the firms in the lowest tercile. However, we find differences in firm characteristics
among these two groups and therefore follow a matching procedure to control for these
differences. Still, firms in the top tercile have a higher exposure to the public sector
and we are concerned about the potential endogeneity that this can cause. To solve
this, we take advantage of the plan’s plausibly exogenous disbursement implementation
and run another DID procedure using as control group some firms that were paid a
year later. These firms are similar on all observables except in size, we correct this by
matching firms in phase 2 with firms of similar size from phase 1.
2.4.1 Methodology 1: analyzing the heterogeneity in the size of the
liquidity shock
Our first empirical strategy uses a DID methodology that exploits heterogeneity in the
size of the liquidity injection and the time difference before and after the shock.
To construct the first difference, we separate firms (only firms with government
arrears that participate in the first phase of the FFPS) in three quantiles according to
the size of the liquidity shock they receive.10 The first difference exploits heterogeneity
in the size of the shock that the firms are exposed to. For that purpose, we drop the
firms in the middle quantile in order to better gauge the effect of receiving a big liquidity
shock versus the effect of receiving a smaller liquidity shock. The treated group will be
formed by the firms exposed to the big liquidity shock (top quantile), and the control
group will be composed by the group of firms that receive a smaller liquidity shock
(bottom quantile).
There are significant differences in observables among the treated and control
firms. Since both groups of firms appear to be different on several dimensions, they are
likely to differ along unobservable dimensions too. Including control variables in a
linear regression framework might not adequately control for unobservable
heterogeneity between both quantiles (e.g., Irani and Oesch (2013)). Rosenbaum and
9In an extended version of this paper we also use firms randomly downloaded from SABI.
10Liquidity shock is scaled by assets in 2011, as noted in section 2.3.
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Rubin (1983) propose propensity score matching as a method to reduce the bias
originated by the estimation of treatment effects with observational non-random data
sets. In order to achieve objective causal inference, we make use of matching
techniques to try to approximate to randomized trial. To control for the potential
endogeneity that non random data sets can cause, we use a matching approach to
improve the resemblance of firms receiving a high and low liquidity shock.
To avoid endogeneity or spurious correlations it is important that our treated and
control group are similar in all characteristics (observable and unobservable) that can
affect investment (or the variables of interest analyzed in each case). As shown in Table
2.1, this is not the case. Table 2.1 shows means and standard deviations of a list of
variables for the top and bottom quantiles (columns 1 and 2). Columns 3 and 4 in
Table 2.1 report the means and standard deviations of the matched groups, both for the
treated and control group. Table 2.2 develops t-tests to evaluate whether the differences
of means for the unmatched and matched groups are significant. Column 1 reports the
differences of the unmatched groups and column 2 reports the differences of the matched
groups.
We adopt nearest-neighbor propensity score matching, each firm in the top tercile
(treated firms) is matched to a unique firm from the bottom tercile (control firms). We
choose a single match and allow for replacement (the same control firm can be used more
than once as a match). We are more concerned on minimizing the bias at the cost of
larger variance, since our sample is sufficiently large to be less concerned about variance
(Abadie and Imbens (2002)). Moreover, to avoid biased coefficients, we set a caliper of
0.01.11 This implies that some treated firms might not be matched if they do not have
a control firm within the caliper chosen. That is the reason why we observe less firms
after the matching is conducted in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.1.
We match the treated and control group in size (measured by total assets), the
growth rate of sales (proxy for growth opportunities), probabilities of default,
corporate investment12, profitability (measured by EBIT13 to lagged assets) and
industrial classification. We restrict the number of covariates since there exists a
trade-off between the plausibility of the unconfoundedness assumption and common
support (Black and Smith (2004)). According to Sianesi (2004), we must focus on
covariates that simultaneously affect the treatment status (receiving a high liquidity
shock) and the outcome variable (corporate investment). We have chosen these
covariates since they have been proven to be determinants of firm investment decisions
and are significantly different among firms in the top and bottom tercile groups. Once
a match is formed, it is kept for the following years. We ensure that all potential
matches have data on all the covariates for the whole sample.14
11A caliper sets a maximum distance of the propensity score for each treatment and its control.
12Measured as described in Section 2.3.1.
13Earnings before interest and tax.
14As reported in Section 2.3, if a firm does not have observations on all the matching covariates in the
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We conduct the matching prior to the realization of the liquidity shock to make
sure that our matching procedure is exogenous to any effects caused by the shock.
We know that all variables included in the matching model must be unaffected by the
treatment (the liquidity injection of 2012), and thus we carry out the matching by using
the values of the covariates in 2010 and 2011. It is necessary that the treated and
control groups follow parallel trends prior to the realization of the shock. We report the
summary statistics and t-test results of 2011 in the appendix. The fact that our groups
are comparable in 2010 and 2011 is evidence that our matching is robust and correctly
specified.
Finally, the second difference is the time dimension, before and after the liquidity
shock. Since we have yearly information on company financials by the end of the year,
we define the period before the shock as 2010-2011, and the period after the shock as
2012-2013.
This allows us to estimate the differences-in-differences effect of a liquidity shock on
investment: the difference between suppliers that receive a high versus a low liquidity
shock (matched) and the difference between the period before and the period after the
shock.
Our analysis does not only report results using the matched groups. We carry out
baseline regressions to evaluate the data before the matching is done. These regressions
are useful to compare raw results to those that arise from the matched groups and to
better understand the effects of the techniques we apply. Our baseline equation is as
follows:
yit = POST(t≥2012) + σLiquidityShocki × POST(t≥2012) + Firmi + βXit + εit (2.3)
where yit is our variable of interest (corporate investment or short-term financial debt);
POST(t≥2012) is a dummy variable (structural break) that takes value 1 for 2012 and 2013
and zero for years 2010 and 2011; LiquidityShocki is a continuous variable that captures
the size of the liquidity shock;15 LiquidityShocki×POST(t≥2012) is an interaction term;
Firmi is a firm fixed effect and Xit is a vector of controls.
Controls are the same in all regressions and include total assets, capital structure
(liabilities to equity), a bankruptcy dummy,16 an interaction between the bankruptcy
dummy and the capital structure variable, sales to lagged assets, return on assets, growth
rate of return on assets, cash, probability of default, growth rate of sales, EBIT to lagged
assets, short-term debt to long-term debt and a dummy for the firm’s age.17 All controls
four years of our analysis, the firm is dropped and not used to form the matched groups.
15It’s construction has been described in Section 2.3.
16This dummy takes value 1 when the firm has negative equity.
17We construct three age bin classes corresponding to firm’s created after 2005 (young), 1995-2005
(mid), and pre-1995 (old). This dummy is colinear with the firm fixed effect except when the firm
changes age bin.
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are measured prior to the shock. Lagged values are used for all years except for 2013,
in which the value of 2011 is used.18
We compute an analogous regression in which instead of having a continuous
measure of the liquidity shock, we use two groups (high and low) that will be used in
our main DID methodology. We create a dummy that takes value 1 for the high
liquidity group (top quantile or treated group) and zero for the bottom quantile.
Our main DID methodology is based in the following specification:
yit = POST(t≥2012) + δGrouphigh{`i∈LH} × POST(t≥2012) + Firmi + βXit + εit (2.4)
where POST(year≥2012) is analogous to that of equation (2.3); Grouphigh{`i∈LH} is an
indicator of whether liquidity ` in firm i belongs to a group of high liquidity recipients
(those in the top tercile); Grouphigh{`i∈LH} × POST(t≥2012) is an interaction term and
our variable of interest; Firmi is a firm fixed effect and Xit is the vector of controls.
The coefficient of interest is therefore δ, which indicates whether firms that receive a
higher liquidity shock (top tercile and treated firms), invest more than firms that receive
a lower liquidity shock (bottom tercile and control firms) after the realization of the
shock.
Our DID methodology is adjusted to allow for an analysis within groups of default
risk and growth opportunities. Groups are always created by separating firms in the
sample in two quantiles above and below the median.19 These groups are included in
the regressions by interacting the dummies of the groups within our main specification.
As an example, we report how the specification changes when we include default risk:20
yit =
∑
j=Low,High
(ωjPOST(t≥2012) × PDj{PDi∈PDj}
+ γjGrouphigh{`i∈LH} × POST(t≥2012) × PDj{PDi∈PDj})
+ Firmi + βXit + εit (2.5)
where all variables are analogous to those in equation (2.4), except for (PDj{PDi∈PDj}).
(PDlow{PDi∈PDlow}) is equal to one for the firms with default risk below the median and
zero otherwise, and (PDhigh{PDi∈PDhigh}) is equal to one for firms with probabilities of
default above the median and zero otherwise.
18Alternative specifications have been used in which no controls are employed or in which controls are
lagged values for all years including 2012. Results are unchanged. If controls from 2012 or 2013 are
used, there is a risk that they are affected by the treatment. We are not interested in the mechanism
in which the liquidity shock affects investment through other variables, so in our main methodology
we avoid including control variables from 2012 or 2013. If post-treatment controls were added, then
we would have to decompose the effect of the treatment to learn what part of the effect of the
liquidity shock on investment goes directly through the shock, and what part affects investment
through other control variables.
19Section 2.3 explains how groups of default risk and growth opportunities are created.
20The specification is analogous for growth opportunities.
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The specification is as follows when we interact the groups of default risk and growth
opportunities at the same time:
yit =
∑
j=Low,High
∑
k=Low,High
(ρjkPOST(t≥2012) × PDj{PDi∈PDj} ×Growthk{Growthi∈Growthk}
+ λjkGrouphigh{`i∈LH} × POST(t≥2012) × PDj{PDi∈PDj} ×Growthk{Growthi∈Growthk})
+ Firmi + βXit + εit (2.6)
where all variables are analogous to those in equation (2.5), and Growthk{Growthi∈Growthk}
takes different values according to whether firm k belongs to the group with high or low
growth opportunities.
As commented earlier, the size of the liquidity shock depends on the firm’s
exposure to local/regional governments. Thus, our methodology is exposed to potential
endogeneity due to omitted variables if there are unobserved characteristics related to
the size of the liquidity shock that affect investment (or the corresponding variable of
interest) and are not captured by the matching procedure or the controls. A bigger
amount of unpaid arrears might not only be correlated with size, financial constraints
or industrial effects; but also with the “quality” of the governments that a firm works
with or simply with the exposure of the firm to public institutions. We try to control
for this potential endogeneity by including two sets of controls. To control for firms
that work for “lower quality” municipalities (firms that work with municipalities with
a lot of debt and that are worst payers), we construct the following measure per firm:
Quality =
∑n
i=1(weighti × municipalitydebti) where i stands for municipality, n for
the number of municipalities that a firm has unpaid invoices with, weight measures the
percentage weight of unpaid amount in invoices with municipality i respect to all
unpaid invoices, and municipality debt is measured as debt to income of municipality i.
We also include as a control variable the number of municipalities that the firms works
with. Still, it is impossible to assert that our identification strategy is completely clean
of potential endogeneity. We overcome this weakness by taking advantage of a
refinement described in Section 2.4.2.
2.4.2 Methodology 2: analizing the heterogeneity in the
disbursement implementation
Our DID methodology described in Section 2.4.1 is exposed to potential endogeneity
caused by the heterogeneity in the exposure of firms to local and regional authorities.
The ideal experiment would compare firms that have the same exposure to the public
sector. We try to overcome this fragility by exploiting the plan’s plausibly exogenous
disbursement implementation. The specific characteristics of this setting are described
in Section 2.2.1.
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Arrears owed to mancomunidades were paid a year later due to slack of the laws
passed in phase 1. These mancomunidades are not concentrated in specific regions of
Spain, in fact they are spread out and exist in all regional administrations of the country.
Moreover, the industrial distribution of firms that work for mancomunidades is similar
to those that appear in phase 1. Therefore, this second phase can be exploited as a
refinement to measure whether there are significant differences on investment among
the firms that participated in the first phase (received the liquidity shock in mid-2012),
relative to those that participated in the second phase (received the liquidity shock in
mid-2013). By exploiting this refinement, we control for potential endogeneity that
arises from the specificities of firms that work for the public sector.
However, the drawbacks of this methodology are the amount of firms that
exclusively receive the shock in phase 2 and the time spam after the shock. Since we
use year end corporate data (December), firms only had several months to respond to
the liquidity shock. They receive the money in May-July 2012, and we have financial
data of the firms from December 2012. The information from December 2013 cannot
be used in this analysis: the refinement would not be sufficiently clean since the firms
in the second phase received the liquidity shock in August 2013.
We use firms in phase 1 as our treated firms and firms that only participate in phase
2 as our control group. We drop the firms that appear both in phase 1 and phase 2,
since we want our control firms to participate exclusively in phase 2.21 Firms in phase
1 and 2 are very similar on average, except for size. Since we have many more firms in
the first phase, we match each firm in phase 2 with a peer firm from phase 1 to have
common support, drop outliers, and improve the resemblance of the groups to better
approximate to random trial.
Again, we follow a differences in differences testing procedure. However, in this case
we measure the causal effect on investment for firms receiving the liquidity shock in 2012,
and compare them to firms that do not receive the shock in 2012. Now, both groups
have exposure to the public sector. To this end, we need both groups to be comparable.
Our treated group are those firms in phase 1 that receive the cash in mid-2012. Our
control group are those firms in phase 2 that receive the cash a year later. As reported
in Table 2.3, both groups of firms appear to be very similar in all dimensions except for
the size of the liquidity shock and total assets. Firms in phase 2 have less exposure to
the public sector, but are bigger on average. As in our DID analysis, to control for the
potential endogeneity that non random data sets can cause, we use a matching approach
to create control-matched groups. We use a somewhat unusual procedure, since we have
only 647 firms that can be used as controls, and more than 60.000 firms that are treated
(firms that receive the shock in phase 1). We use all the firms in phase 2 (controls) and
find a nearest neighbor for each control in the treated sample.
21The refinement is not as clean if our control firms receive cash also in phase 1. In this methodology
we are particularly interested in achieving a clean identification.
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To avoid endogeneity or spurious correlations, it is important that our two groups
are similar in all characteristics (observable and unobservable) that can affect investment
and debt. Table 2.3 shows means and standard deviations of a list of variables for the
two phases (columns 1 and 2) prior to the shock (2011). We match both groups in the
size of the liquidity shock, firm size (measured by total assets) and industry.
We follow the same criteria as in our main specification and adopt nearest-neighbor
propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), Dehejia and Wahba (1999),
Dehejia and Wahba (2002)). Each firm (for each of the two phases) that does not receive
the liquidity shock (belongs to phase 2) is matched to a unique firm from phase 1 that
receives the shock (treated firms). We choose a single match and allow for replacement
(the same treated firm can be used more than once as a match). Once a match is formed,
it is kept for the following year, we ensure that all potential matches have data on all
the covariates for the whole sample (if not the firm is dropped from our sample). The
means and standard deviations of the matched groups are listed in columns 3 and 4 of
Table 2.3. We conduct the matching prior to the realization of the liquidity shock to
make sure that our matching procedure is exogenous to any effects caused by the shock.
We know that all variables included in the matching model must be unaffected by the
treatment (liquidity shock), and thus we carry out the matching in 2011 (the year before
the shock is realized).
Baseline equation:
yit = κPOST(t=2012) + ηPhase1{i∈Ph1} × POST(t=2012) + Firmi + βXit + εit (2.7)
where Phase1{i∈Ph1} is a dummy variable that takes value one for firms that
participate in phase 1 and zero for firms that participate in phase 2 (this variable can
also take a continuous value, being zero for firms in phase 2 and continuous in the
amount of the shock received by the firm in phase 1); POST(t=2012) is a dummy
variable (structural break) that takes value 1 for 2012 and zero in year 2011;
Phase1{i∈Ph1} × I(t=2012) is an interaction term and Xit is a vector of controls. The
coefficient of interest is η, which indicates the effect on investment of receiving the
liquidity shock in 2012 versus not having received it yet.
The baseline equation interacted with default risk dummies is:
yit =
∑
j=Low,High
(τjPOST(t=2012) × PDj{PDi∈PDj}
+ φjPhase1{i∈Ph1} × POST(t=2012) × PDj{PDi∈PDj}) + Firmi + βXit + εit (2.8)
where the notation is analogous to equation (2.7) but now each term is interacted
with the dummies of default risk. (PDLow{PDi∈PDLow}) is equal to one for the firms with
default risk below the median and zero otherwise, and (PDHigh{PDi∈PDHigh}) is equal
to one for firms with probabilities of default above the median and zero otherwise.
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In equation (2.9), we show the specification used when we interact the groups of
default risk and growth opportunities at the same time:
yit =
∑
j=Low,High
∑
k=Low,High
(κjkPOST(t=2012) × PDj{PDi∈PDj} ×Growthk{Growthi∈Growthk}
+ µjkPhase1{i∈Ph1} × POST(t=2012) × PDj{PDi∈PDj} ×Growthk{Growthi∈Growthk})
+ Firmi + βXit + εit (2.9)
where all variables are analogous to those in equation (2.8), and Growthk{Growthi∈Growthk}
takes different values according to whether firm k belongs to the group with high or low
growth opportunities.
2.5 Results
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 use the specifications, matching techniques and controls described in
Section 2.4.1. Table 2.5 reports the effects on investment and Table 2.6 reports the effects
on short-term financial debt. Both tables follow the same exact structure. Column 1
reports results before the matching is applied, as described in equation (2.3) of Section
2.4.1. In column 1 the liquidity shock is continuous in the amount of the liquidity
shock received by the firm. Columns 2 to 5 use the matched data. Column 2 is based
in the specification described in equation (2.4). Columns 3 and 4 report results from
equation (2.5), where groups of default risk and growth opportunities are separately and
subsequently interacted with the variables of interest. Finally, column 5 is based in the
specification in equation (2.6), where the groups of growth opportunities and default risk
are interacted simultaneously with the variables of interest. Due to space availability
and for clarity of exposition, only the coefficients of interest are reported.
Table 2.5 reports results on investment. Column 1 confirms that the relation
between investment and the continuous amount of liquidity received by the firm is
positive and significant. This result suggests that 3.5% of cash transfers were devoted
to increase investment.22 Since total cash transfers were around 27bn euros, this
implies that this liquidity injection generated an increase of direct long-term
investment of around 0.93bn euros. However, when the binary specification for the
liquidity shock is used (column 2), the significance disappears. This is because all the
within group heterogeneity is lost and both groups in aggregate are not significantly
different. In column 3, the average effect on treated firms is divided into two groups
according to their default risk. An important result arises: the sensitivity of
investment to the liquidity shock is positive and significant for firms with low default
risk. For every 100 euros received from the liquidity shock, firms belonging to the low
22Holding all other variables constant, we can assume this since we control for debt, cash or sales
growth.
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group of default risk invest on average 0.9 euros more than firms belonging to the high
group.23 In column 4 we recognize a positive response of investment to liquidity when
firms have high growth opportunities, however the coefficient is not significant. In the
last column we observe a positive and significant coefficient for firms with low
probabilities of default and high growth opportunities. Among firms with high growth
opportunities, for every 100 euros of cash received from the liquidity shock, firms that
have low probabilities of default invest on average 1.4 euros more than firms with high
probabilities of default.24 Among firms with high default risk, for every 100 euros of
cash received from the liquidity shock, firms that have high growth opportunities
invest on average 0.6 euros more than firms with low growth opportunities.25
In Table 2.6 we observe a negative relation among the liquidity shock and the growth
of short-term financial debt. Most firms that receive the higher liquidity shock seem to
reduce short-term financial debt more than firms that receive the lower liquidity shock.
This result is significant both for the continuous specification of liquidity (column 1),
as well as for the binary specification (column 2). For every 100 euros of the liquidity
shock received, firms dedicate on average 8.6 euros to reduce short-term financial debt.
In other words, firms dedicate on average 8.6% of cash transfers to repay financial debt.
For every 100 euros, firms in the high tercile of the liquidity shock dedicate 1.3 euros
more to reduce short-term financial debt than firms in the low tercile. Results are
much more significant for short-term debt than for investment. All firms seem to use
the liquidity received to reduce debt. However, there is heterogeneity in the sensitivity
to reduce debt that depends on firm characteristics that are captured by our groups of
default risk and growth opportunities. Firms with higher risk of default and lower growth
opportunities exhibit higher sensitivities to reduce short-term financial debt (columns 3
and 4 respectively). For every 100 euros, firms with higher default risk dedicate 1 euro
more to reduce short-term financial debt than firms with lower default risk.26 Similarly,
for every 100 euros, firms with lower growth opportunities dedicate 0.6 euros more to
reduce short-term debt than firms with higher growth opportunities. In fact, these
results are confirmed in column 5 when these groups are interacted.
Tables 2.7 and 2.8 show results using the methodology described in Section 2.4.2.
In this case, we take advantage of the plan’s plausibly exogenous disbursement
implementation.
23To obtain the differential impact on investment of belonging to low and high groups of default risk,
we subtract the two coefficients of column 3: 0.545-(-0.353)≈ 0.9. Both coefficients are significantly
different. The average liquidity of both groups of default risk is not significantly different.
24We subtract the two coefficients of column 5 for high growth opportunities: 0.760-(-0.599)≈ 1.4. Both
coefficients are significantly different. The average liquidity of these two groups is not significantly
different.
25We subtract the two coefficients of column 5 for high default risk: 0.760-(.157)≈ 0.6. Both coefficients
are significantly different. The average liquidity of both groups of low default risk is not significantly
different.
26We subtract the two coefficients of column 3: -1.768-(-0.796)≈ 1. Both coefficients are significantly
different. The average liquidity of both groups is not significantly different.
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In Table 2.7 we show the results for regressions in which the dependent variable is
firm investment, and Table 2.8 measures the effects of the liquidity shock on short-term
financial debt. Column 1 uses all firms in phase 1 and phase 2, no matching is carried
out, therefore there are many more firms from phase 1. Column 1 shows results for
equation (2.7), where phase 1 takes a continuous value. It takes value zero for firms in
phase 2, and it is continuous in the amount of the liquidity shock received by the firm
in phase 1. These results are very similar to those obtained in column 1 of Tables 2.5
and 2.6 respectively. There are small differences in the size of the coefficients due to the
definition of outliers.27 Column 2 is analogous to column 1 but the liquidity shock is a
binary variable. Column 3 shows results for equation (2.8). Column 4 reports results
for the high and low group of growth opportunities. Finally, column 5 interacts both
groups as described in equation (2.9).
Table 2.7 corroborates results from Table 2.5. Firms with lower default risk and
higher growth opportunities are more sensitive to invest once they receive the liquidity
shock. However, although the sign and significance of the coefficients points in the same
direction, the sizes are not comparable. In this section, the control group is made of
firms that have not received any liquidity since they belong to phase 2, in Section 2.4.1
firms in the control group had received a lower liquidity shock relative to the treated
group. It is therefore expected that the size of the coefficients in this section is larger
than in the previous section for columns 2, 3, 4 and 5.
Table 2.8 shows that firms with higher default risk are more sensitive to reduce
short-term financial debt. These results are similar to those obtained in Section 2.4.1.
On average, firms dedicate 14% of cash transfers to reduce short-term financial debt.28
In column 3 we corroborate that firms with higher default risk exhibit a higher sensitivity
to reduce short-term financial debt once they receive the liquidity shock. Due to the
reduced power problem mentioned, no significance is achieved for the regression with
growth opportunities (column 4). However, the magnitude of the coefficients suggests
that firms with lower growth opportunities seem to reduce more short-term debt.
Power is lost in these regressions relative to those in Section 2.4.1, since the number
of firms used is much smaller. There is a trade-off between this methodology and the
methodology presented in Section 2.4.1. In this case, a clean causal identification is
pursued at the cost of using less firms and thus having less power.29 In the analysis in
Section 2.4.1, full exogeneity cannot be assured. However, results are robust, significance
is strong and power is not an issue since sample size is big enough. By using both
methodologies and obtaining similar results, we prove that our findings are robust and
strong.
27In both methodologies, any firm that has missing values for a covariate used for the matching in the
sample period is dropped. Since covariates and sample periods are different in both methodologies,
results are not comparable.
28Again, as previously mentioned, there are small differences in the size of the coefficients due to the
definition of outliers.
29Robust standard errors at the firm level are not shown since significance in this analysis is an issue.
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2.6 Conclusion
In this paper we study the Spanish central government’s decision to make a huge and
direct liquidity injection to credit constrained firms during the banking crisis. The
Spanish economy was undergoing a strong credit crunch in a severe recessionary
environment. Using a unique data set and a clean causal identification strategy we find
a positive and significant response of corporate investment to this unexpected
governmental liquidity injection. This indicates that unorthodox stimulus policies can
reactivate economic growth when the banking industry is not providing sufficient
credit. Our estimates are the joint result of both the supply and demand of liquidity
during the recession. The positive impact of a higher liquidity supply is moderated by
the potential contemporaneous drop in liquidity demand as firms’ investment
opportunities vanish. Still, we find positive and significant reactions of investment to
liquidity.
We also find that the impact of this policy is very different across firms. Our results
show an heterogeneous reaction of firms to the liquidity shock. Firms with lower default
risk and higher growth opportunities are more sensitive to increase investment, whereas
firms with higher default risk, or that are highly leveraged, prefer to repay debt. From
a policy perspective, given that the main objective of the governmental plan was to
increase aggregate investment and to foster economic growth, our results give important
insights on which are the appropriate firms to target with a public liquidity injection:
firms with low default risk and high growth opportunities. It remains to be explored
whether the liquidity injection also affected firms’ labor policies and competitiveness.
Finally, we contribute to the debate on the sensitivity of investment to cash flows.
The positive and significant response of corporate investment to the liquidity injection
is evidence that firms were indeed financially constrained. We further quantify this
sensitivity and find that firms invest on average 4% of the cash received. On the other
hand, 13% of this liquidity is used to repay debt.
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2.7 Tables
Table 2.1 Quality of the match for the DID analysis in 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GHLiq=1 GHLiq=0 GHLiq=1 on sup. GHLiq=0 (M)
Liquidity shock(contin) 0.13 0.00 0.12 0.00
(0.23) (0.00) (0.18) (0.00)
Total assets 7136.30 21096.52 8261.16 12299.10
(60799.84) (265236.15) (66259.14) (92927.01)
Employees 68.55 81.73 68.08 69.71
(615.91) (1016.87) (648.18) (600.99)
Probability of default 9.33 9.55 9.45 9.21
(18.10) (17.49) (18.17) (17.03)
ST debt to LT debt 6.27 8.97 6.64 9.59
(37.66) (94.29) (40.68) (103.97)
Investment 0.55 1.21 0.43 0.47
(22.99) (33.51) (21.59) (12.96)
Sales growth 0.15 0.02 0.03 0.01
(5.69) (1.87) (0.94) (0.90)
EBIT to lagged assets 4.17 3.02 3.03 3.02
(18.98) (19.09) (14.73) (11.35)
Altman Z-score 2.23 2.10 2.17 2.12
(1.64) (1.34) (1.60) (1.32)
Cash 519.62 1166.17 592.62 721.72
(6220.09) (24363.40) (6815.17) (9480.60)
Observations 10134 10134 7854 7854
This table reports summary statistics of firm-year observations in 2010 for the sample used
for the DID analysis. Firms are classified as treated firms (column 1) if GHLiq = 1, which
implies that these firms are classified in the top tercile regarding the size of the liquidity shock
received, or as control firms (column 2) if GHliq = 0, which implies they belong to the bottom
tercile. Columns 3 and 4 report summary statistics after the matching is realized. In column 3
we classify treated firms on support and in column 4 all control matched firms. Liquidity shock
(contin) is the size of the liquidity size as described in Section 2.3.2, total assets and employees
are measured in thousands, probabilities of default are described in Section 2.3.3, ST debt to
LT debt is the ratio of short-term debt to long-term debt (includes debt issued and financial
debt), investment and sales growth are calculated as described in Section 2.3.1 and Section
?? respectively, EBIT lo lagged assets is earnings before interest and taxes divided by lagged
total assets, Altman Z-score is measured as in Altman (1968), cash is measured in thousands
and includes cash and very liquid assets. Numbers reported are cross-sectional averages and
standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2.2 Ttest analysis: differences of means for
unmatched and matched groups in 2010
(1) (2)
Mean differences Mean differences (Matched)
Liquidity shock(contin) -0.127∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗
(-56.02) (-58.51)
Total assets 13960.2∗∗∗ 4037.9∗∗
(5.16) (3.14)
Employees 13.18 1.635
(1.10) (0.16)
Probability of default 0.215 -0.238
(0.86) (-0.85)
ST debt to LT debt 2.698∗ 2.942
(2.21) (1.93)
Investment 0.665 0.0374
(1.65) (0.13)
Sales growth -0.129∗ -0.0250
(-2.09) (-1.71)
EBIT to lagged assets -1.146∗∗∗ -0.0100
(-4.29) (-0.05)
Altman Z-score -0.128∗∗∗ -0.0446
(-6.11) (-1.91)
Cash 646.6∗ 129.1
(2.52) (0.95)
Observations 20268 15708
This table reports t-test results of firm-year observations in 2010 for the sample
used for the DID analysis. Column 1 of this table analyzes mean differences of
the unmatched sample (columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.1). Column 2 analyzes
mean differences of the matched sample (columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.1).
Liquidity shock (contin) is the size of the liquidity size as described in Section
2.3.2, total assets and employees are measured in thousands, probabilities of
default are described in Section 2.3.3, ST debt to LT debt is the ratio of
short-term debt to long-term debt (includes debt issued and financial debt),
investment and sales growth are calculated as described in Section 2.3.1 and
Section ?? respectively, EBIT lo lagged assets is earnings before interest and
taxes divided by lagged total assets, Altman Z-score is measured as in Altman
(1968), cash is measured in thousands and includes cash and very liquid assets.
T-statistics in parentheses. * p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p< 0.001
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Table 2.3 Quality of the match for phases 1 and 2 in 2011
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Phase2 Phase1 Phase2 on sup. Phase1 (M)
Liquidity shock(contin) 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02
(0.08) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08)
Total assets 26475.91 7823.03 26475.91 27393.65
(198715.89) (89645.75) (198715.89) (226550.85)
Employees 57.97 47.81 57.97 104.09
(432.56) (588.45) (432.56) (720.86)
Probability of default 16.13 13.67 16.13 14.48
(24.28) (21.87) (24.28) (23.14)
ST debt to LT debt 11.40 8.56 11.40 7.34
(91.00) (243.61) (91.00) (45.09)
Investment -0.37 0.05 -0.37 0.45
(10.23) (22.74) (10.23) (13.73)
Sales growth 0.04 0.21 0.04 0.17
(0.73) (29.84) (0.73) (1.90)
EBIT to lagged assets -0.04 0.98 -0.04 0.92
(18.66) (29.32) (18.66) (20.60)
Altman Z-score 1.69 1.95 1.69 1.84
(1.77) (1.80) (1.77) (1.63)
Cash 344.71 500.55 344.71 365.85
(1713.51) (14890.41) (1713.51) (1326.64)
Observations 388 39007 388 388
This table reports summary statistics of firm-year observations in 2011 for the sample
used for the refinement DID analysis. Firms are classified as control firms (column 1) if
they receive the money in phase 2, or as treated firms (column 2) if they belong to phase
1. Columns 3 and 4 report summary statistics after the matching is realized. In column
3 we classify control firms on support and column 4 exhibits treated matched firms.
Liquidity shock (contin) is the size of the liquidity size as described in Section 2.3.2, total
assets and employees are measured in thousands, probabilities of default are described
in Section 2.3.3, ST debt to LT debt is the ratio of short-term debt to long-term debt
(includes debt issued and financial debt), investment and sales growth are calculated as
described in Section 2.3.1 and Section ?? respectively, EBIT lo lagged assets is earnings
before interest and taxes divided by lagged total assets, Altman Z-score is measured as in
Altman (1968), cash is measured in thousands and includes cash and very liquid assets.
Numbers reported are cross-sectional averages and standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2.4 Ttest analysis: differences of means for
unmatched and matched groups in 2011
(1) (2)
Mean differences Mean differences (Matched)
Liquidity shock(contin) 0.0274∗∗∗ 0.00186
(6.37) (0.31)
Total assets -18652.9 917.7
(-1.85) (0.06)
Employees -10.16 46.12
(-0.45) (1.04)
Probability of default -2.456∗ -1.646
(-1.98) (-0.97)
ST debt to LT debt -2.837 -4.055
(-0.47) (-0.62)
Investment 0.419 0.828
(0.79) (0.95)
Sales growth 0.166 0.131
(1.06) (1.27)
EBIT to lagged assets 1.012 0.954
(1.06) (0.68)
Altman Z-score 0.256∗∗ 0.150
(2.83) (1.22)
Cash 155.8 21.14
(1.31) (0.19)
Observations 39395 776
This table reports t-test results of firm-year observations in 2011 for the sample
used for the DID analysis. Column 1 of this table analyzes mean differences of
the unmatched sample (columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.3). Column 2 analyzes
mean differences of the matched sample (columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.3).
Liquidity shock (contin) is the size of the liquidity size as described in Section
2.3.2, total assets and employees are measured in thousands, probabilities of
default are described in Section 2.3.3, ST debt to LT debt is the ratio of
short-term debt to long-term debt (includes debt issued and financial debt),
investment and sales growth are calculated as described in Section 2.3.1 and
Section ?? respectively, EBIT to lagged assets is earnings before interest and
taxes divided by lagged total assets, Altman Z-score is measured as in Altman
(1968), cash is measured in thousands and includes cash and very liquid assets.
T-statistics in parentheses. * p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p< 0.001.
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Table 2.5 Effects on Investment (Methodology 1).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Cont-Liq Match M-FC M-GO M-FC-GO
Post -0.902*** -0.716***
(0.144) (0.157)
Post*Liquidity shock(cont) 3.455***
(0.772)
Post*GroupHigh 0.075
(0.227)
Post*GHLiq*PD-low 0.545*
(0.299)
Post*GHLiq*PD-high -0.353
(0.465)
Post*GHLiq*Growth-low -0.078
(0.268)
Post*GHLiq*Growth-high 0.160
(0.468)
Post*GHLiq*PD-low*Growth-low 0.157
(0.393)
Post*GHLiq*PD-high*Growth-low -0.241
(0.340)
Post*GHLiq*PD-low*Growth-high 0.760**
(0.384)
Post*GHLiq*PD-high*Growth-high -0.599
(1.099)
Observations 47,499 37,742 37,742 37,742 37,742
R-squared 0.007 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.014
Number of firms 14,510 11,385 11,385 11,385 11,385
This table presents estimates from panel regressions explaining yearly investment for the period
2010 to 2013. Post is a dummy variable that takes value one for years 2012 and 2013. Liquidity
shock (cont) is the size of the liquidity shock received by the firm scaled by total assets in 2011,
GroupHigh or GHLiq is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for the firms in the highest tercile
of the liquidity shock and PD-low (PD-high) and Growth-low (Growth-high) are dummy variables
that take value one for the firms in the bottom (top) half of probabilities of default and growth
opportunities, respectively. Other controls include total assets, capital structure (liabilities to
equity), a bankruptcy dummy (this dummy takes value 1 when the firm has negative equity),
an interaction between the bankruptcy dummy and the capital structure variable, sales to lagged
assets, return on assets, growth rate of return on assets, cash, probability of default, growth rate
of sales, EBIT to lagged assets, short-term debt to long-term debt and a dummy for the firm’s age.
All controls are measured prior to the shock, so lagged values are used for all years except for 2013,
in which the value of 2011 is used. All regressions include firm fixed effects. Within R-squared is
reported. Robust standard errors clustered at the matched-firm level and shown in parentheses.
***, ** or * indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% level, respectively.
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Table 2.6 Effects on Short-Term Financial Debt (Methodology 1).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Cont-Liq Match M-FC M-GO M-FC-GO
Post -0.985*** -0.812***
(0.131) (0.156)
Post*Liquidity shock(cont) -8.608***
(1.635)
Post*GroupHigh -1.303***
(0.252)
Post*GHLiq*PD-low -0.796***
(0.256)
Post*GHLiq*PD-high -1.768***
(0.414)
Post*GHLiq*Growth-low -1.613***
(0.346)
Post*GHLiq*Growth-high -1.035***
(0.365)
Post*GHLiq*PD-low*Growth-low -0.585
(0.358)
Post*GHLiq*PD-high*Growth-low -2.290***
(0.514)
Post*GHLiq*PD-low*Growth-high -0.969***
(0.360)
Post*GHLiq*PD-high*Growth-high -1.134*
(0.682)
Observations 44,749 35,577 35,577 35,577 35,577
R-squared 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.022 0.024
Number of firms 13,838 10,859 10,859 10,859 10,859
This table presents estimates from panel regressions explaining yearly short-term debt for the period
2010 to 2013. Post is a dummy variable that takes value one for years 2012 and 2013. Liquidity shock
(cont) is the size of the liquidity shock received by the firm scaled by total assets in 2011, GroupHigh or
GHLiq is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for the firms in the highest tercile of the liquidity shock
and PD-low (PD-high) and Growth-low (Growth-high) are dummy variables that take value one for the
firms in the bottom (top) half of probabilities of default and growth opportunities, respectively. Other
controls include total assets, capital structure (liabilities to equity), a bankruptcy dummy (this dummy
takes value 1 when the firm has negative equity), an interaction between the bankruptcy dummy and
the capital structure variable, sales to lagged assets, return on assets, growth rate of return on assets,
cash, probability of default, growth rate of sales, EBIT to lagged assets, short-term debt to long-term
debt and a dummy for the firm’s age. All controls are measured prior to the shock, so lagged values are
used for all years except for 2013, in which the value of 2011 is used. All regressions include firm fixed
effects. Within R-squared is reported. Robust standard errors clustered at the matched-firm level and
shown in parentheses. ***, ** or * indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% or 10%
level, respectively.
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Table 2.7 Effects on Investment (Methodology 2).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Cont-Liq Match M-PD M-GO M-PD-GO
Post -0.665*** -0.873
(0.105) (1.150)
Post*Phase1-Liquidity(cont) 3.229***
(1.128)
Post*Phase1 1.538
(1.570)
Post*Phase1*PD-low 4.689*
(2.438)
Post*Phase1*PD-high -0.799
(2.052)
Post*Phase1*Growth-low -1.289
(2.291)
Post*Phase1*Growth-high 4.135*
(2.160)
Post*Phase1*PD-low*Growth-low -1.660
(4.163)
Post*Phase1*PD-high*Growth-low -1.062
(2.752)
Post*Phase1*PD-low*Growth-high 7.876***
(3.028)
Post*Phase1*PD-high*Growth-high -0.695
(3.171)
Observations 44,580 879 879 879 879
R-squared 0.008 0.067 0.078 0.076 0.089
Number of firms 25,497 502 502 502 502
This table presents estimates from panel regressions explaining yearly investment for the period
2011 to 2012. Post is a dummy variable that takes value one for 2012. Phase1−Liquidity(cont)
is the size of the liquidity shock received by the firm scaled by total assets in 2011, Phase1
is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for the firms that participate in phase 1 and zero for
firms that participate in phase 2, and PD-low (PD-high) and Growth-low (Growth-high) are
dummy variables that take value one for the firms in the bottom (top) half of probabilities
of default and growth opportunities, respectively. Other controls include total assets, capital
structure (liabilities to equity), a bankruptcy dummy (this dummy takes value 1 when the firm
has negative equity), an interaction between the bankruptcy dummy and the capital structure
variable, sales to lagged assets, return on assets, growth rate of return on assets, cash, probability
of default, growth rate of sales, EBIT to lagged assets, short-term debt to long-term debt and a
dummy for the firm’s age. All controls are measured prior to the shock, so lagged values of the
variables are used for all years. All regressions include firm fixed effects. Within R-squared is
reported. Robust standard errors clustered at the matched-firm level and shown in parentheses.
***, ** or * indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% level, respectively.
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Table 2.8 Effects on Short-Term Financial Debt (Methodology 2).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Cont-Liq Match M-PD M-GO M-PD-GO
Post -0.998*** 1.226
(0.145) (1.301)
Post*Phase1-Liquidity(cont) -14.184***
(1.593)
Post*Phase1 -2.208
(1.764)
Post*Phase1*PD-low 0.283
(2.772)
Post*Phase1*PD-high -3.989*
(2.304)
Post*Phase1*Growth-low -3.250
(2.596)
Post*Phase1*Growth-high -1.241
(2.431)
Post*Phase1*PD-low*Growth-low -1.231
(4.827)
Post*Phase1*PD-high*Growth-low -4.033
(3.105)
Post*Phase1*PD-low*Growth-high 1.012
(3.434)
Post*Phase1*PD-high*Growth-high -3.925
(3.594)
Observations 42,484 840 840 840 840
R-squared 0.060 0.476 0.479 0.477 0.479
Number of firms 24,171 476 476 476 476
This table presents estimates from panel regressions explaining yearly short-term financial debt for
the period 2011 to 2012. Post is a dummy variable that takes value one for 2012. Phase1-Liquidity
(cont) is the size of the liquidity shock received by the firm scaled by total assets in 2011, Phase1
is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for the firms that participate in phase 1 and zero for firms
that participate in phase 2, and PD-low (PD-high) and Growth-low (Growth-high) are dummy
variables that take value one for the firms in the bottom (top) half of probabilities of default and
growth opportunities, respectively. Other controls include total assets, capital structure (liabilities
to equity), a bankruptcy dummy (this dummy takes value 1 when the firm has negative equity),
an interaction between the bankruptcy dummy and the capital structure variable, sales to lagged
assets, return on assets, growth rate of return on assets, cash, probability of default, growth rate
of sales, EBIT to lagged assets, short-term debt to long-term debt and a dummy for the firm’s
age. All controls are measured prior to the shock, so lagged values of the variables are used for all
years. All regressions include firm fixed effects. Within R-squared is reported. Robust standard
errors clustered at the matched-firm level and shown in parentheses. ***, ** or * indicates that
the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% level, respectively.
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2.8 Appendix
2.8.1 Alternative methodology: flexible time model
An extended version of this paper makes use of a flexible model with year fixed effects
instead of PRE and POST dummies (Mora and Reggio (2013)). This is useful to compare
whether the two years before and after the shock are significantly different among each
other or can be grouped together. We use 2010 as our baseline year and omit it.
2.8.2 Random download
We base the download on the CIFs (firm fiscal identification code) of the firms. CIFs
are constructed by 9 characters, first character is a letter that indicates the legal type of
the firm, the following two numbers indicate the region of the headquarters of the firm,
the next five numbers depend on the time when the firm was registered in the Spanish
Official Registry, and the last number is a control digit. To construct the random sample,
we follow the subsequent steps:
1. Download all the CIFs that exist in SABI.
2. Eliminate all the CIFs of firms that participate in the FFPP.
3. Segment the remaining sample according to the legal types of firms.
4. For each legal type, keep all firms whose penultimate number is a one.
5. Calculate the percentage of the different legal types of firms that appear in the
FFPS database.
6. Randomly download from each legal type of firm group as many firms as needed
in order to have similar percentages as those observed for the FFPS database.
7. For some specific types, there are not enough firms of a certain legal type in my
random groups. Our solution is to randomly download other firms whose penultimate
number is not a one.
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2.8.3 Analysis of the quality of the DID match for 2011
Table 2.9 Quality of the match for the DID analysis in 2011
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GHLiq=1 GHLiq=0 GHLiq=1 on sup. GHLiq=0 (M)
Liquidity shock(contin) 0.13 0.00 0.12 0.00
(0.23) (0.00) (0.18) (0.00)
Total assets 7253.02 21263.17 8427.23 12368.68
(62463.07) (270868.76) (68978.29) (95951.87)
Employees 66.07 82.77 66.25 69.51
(595.45) (1035.55) (632.51) (584.94)
Probability of default 11.97 11.29 11.59 11.46
(20.39) (19.26) (19.96) (19.59)
ST debt to LT debt 5.99 8.76 6.15 9.35
(38.15) (107.28) (39.49) (119.36)
Investment -0.60 0.11 -0.47 -0.35
(9.91) (20.55) (9.90) (11.35)
Sales growth 0.04 0.40 -0.01 0.01
(1.28) (29.13) (0.42) (0.58)
EBIT to lagged assets 1.33 1.60 1.31 1.42
(16.60) (14.23) (14.78) (11.37)
Altman Z-score 2.05 2.02 2.03 2.02
(1.75) (1.34) (1.69) (1.34)
Cash 466.90 1135.99 535.72 686.30
(6593.61) (29271.79) (7380.04) (8752.10)
Observations 10134 10134 7854 7854
This table reports summary statistics of firm-year observations in 2011 for the sample used for
the DID analysis. Matching is done in 2010 as described in Section 2.4.1. Firms are classified
as treated firms (column 1) if GHLiq = 1, which implies that these firms are classified in the
top tercile regarding the size of the liquidity shock received, or as control firms (column 2) if
GHliq = 0, which implies they belong to the bottom tercile. Columns 3 and 4 report summary
statistics after the matching is realized. In column 3 we classify treated firms on support and in
column 4 all control matched firms. Liquidity shock (contin) is the size of the liquidity size as
described in Section 2.3.2, total assets and employees are measured in thousands, probabilities
of default are described in Section 2.3.3, ST debt to LT debt is the ratio of short-term debt
to long-term debt (includes debt issued and financial debt), investment and sales growth are
calculated as described in Section 2.3.1 and Section ?? respectively, EBIT lo lagged assets is
earnings before interest and taxes divided by lagged total assets, Altman Z-score is measured
as in Altman (1968), cash is measured in thousands and includes cash and very liquid assets.
Numbers reported are cross-sectional averages and standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2.10 Ttest for the DID analysis in 2011
(1) (2)
Mean differences Mean differences (Matched)
Liquidity shock(contin) -0.127∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗
(-56.02) (-58.51)
Total assets 14010.2∗∗∗ 3941.4∗∗
(5.07) (2.96)
Employees 16.70 3.256
(1.39) (0.33)
Probability of default -0.679∗ -0.128
(-2.44) (-0.40)
ST debt to LT debt 2.777∗ 3.206
(2.01) (1.86)
Investment 0.717∗∗ 0.123
(3.16) (0.72)
Sales growth 0.364 0.0247∗∗
(1.25) (3.05)
EBIT to lagged assets 0.270 0.110
(1.24) (0.52)
Altman Z-score -0.0344 -0.00704
(-1.57) (-0.29)
Cash 669.1∗ 150.6
(2.18) (1.13)
Observations 20268 15708
This table reports t-test results of firm-year observations in 2011 for the sample
used for the DID analysis. Matching is done in 2010 as described in Section
2.4.1. Column 1 of this table analyzes mean differences of the unmatched
sample (columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.1). Column 2 analyzes mean differences of
the matched sample (columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.9). Liquidity shock (contin)
is the size of the liquidity size as described in Section 2.3.2, total assets and
employees are measured in thousands, probabilities of default are described in
Section 2.3.3, ST debt to LT debt is the ratio of short-term debt to long-term
debt (includes debt issued and financial debt), investment and sales growth
are calculated as described in Section 2.3.1 and Section ?? respectively, EBIT
lo lagged assets is earnings before interest and taxes divided by lagged total
assets, Altman Z-score is measured as in Altman (1968), cash is measured in
thousands and includes cash and very liquid assets. T-statistics in parentheses.
* p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p< 0.001
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3.1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis has shown that financial shocks can have important
macroeconomic effects. Contemporary macroeconomic models now routinely include
“financial frictions” and “financial shocks” to explain how economic fluctuations are
generated and propagated. This increased focus on financial variables has shown that
financial constraints and worsening credit conditions faced by firms during recessions
are extremely important to explain aggregate labor market variables, such as
employment and unemployment. Two recent examples of this work are Jermann and
Quadrini (2012) and Christiano et al. (2015), who use Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibirium (DSGE) models to study the macroeconomic effects of the financial shock
that led into the Great Recession in the US, and find that the tightening of financial
conditions faced by firms plays the main role in explaining the deterioration of
economic activity and of employment.1
Complementing the evidence stemming from DSGE models, economic theory
provides plausible mechanisms that explain the connection between credit constrained
firms, employment, and unemployment. For example, Petrosky-Nadeau (2014) shows
how the easing of financing constraints generates job creation in a standard
search-and-matching model of equilibrium unemployment in which firms require
external financing to post vacancies. Chugh (2013) shows that a model in which firms
require working capital to finance their operating costs, when calibrated to the cyclical
1The Great Recession gave rise to an explosion in the number of papers studying financial shocks and
their effects on economic fluctuations, both within and outside the DSGE tradition. Because of their
sheer number we cannot possibly do justice to all of them. A necessarily arbitrary sample of recent
papers on this topic includes Bassetto et al. (2015), Beck et al. (2014), Christiano et al. (2014),
Liu and Minford (2014), and Meeks (2012). The main takeaway from these papers is that financial
frictions and financial shocks matter for economic fluctuations. Considering a longer time frame,
Schularick and Taylor (2012) show that credit growth has been a powerful predictor of financial
crises in the period 1870–2008 and that these crises have had sizable output costs.
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nature of financial conditions, generates large fluctuations of labor market quantities.2
In this paper, we complement the existing theoretical literature by empirically
measuring how easing credit constraints affects aggregate employment variables in a
recessionary environment.
Our specific question is if—and how—a sudden and unexpected liquidity injection
to the non-financial private sector affects aggregate employment. To answer this question
we use Spain in the Great Recession as our laboratory. In early 2012, the Spanish central
government announced that it would pay all invoices in arrears owed by sub-national
governments at the regional and municipality level. This program was large (it amounted
to almost 3% of Spanish GDP), and unexpected: it was first mentioned in the press in
January 2012.
Municipalities were exposed to the liquidity shock to a different degree. We therefore
identify the effect of the liquidity shock on employment from the cross-sectional variation
in municipal employment data by comparing municipalities that received a high liquidity
shock to those that received a low liquidity shock and how they fared before and after
2012. We track the evolution of employment over a window of two years prior to and
after the shock, i.e., from 2010 to 2014. To take into account potential selection bias due
to the heterogeneity of the size of liquidity shocks across municipalities we use a sample
where we match on covariates.
3.2 Literature Review
Delgado Te´llez et al. (2015) studied the impact of the repayment of sub-national debt
in arrears in Spain from an aggregate perspective. They use total payments made to
cancel commercial debt by municipalities and regional governments and construct a
quarterly time series of payments from the public sector to the private sector. In a first
exercise they estimate a VAR specification and find that the reduction of commercial
arrears is associated with a cumulative GDP growth of 0.55 percentage points over the
period 2012–2014. In a second exercise they use the Quarterly Model of Banco de
Espan˜a (MTBE, Modelo Trimestral del Banco de Espan˜a), a large-scale
macro-econometric model used for medium term macroeconomic forecasting of the
Spanish economy. They find that repayment of commercial debt in arrears could
account for growth in GDP on the level of between 0.3 and 0.6 cumulative percentage
points over the period 2012–2014, depending on the degree to which the shock was
anticipated. GDP growth in the model is explained mainly through a rise in household
consumption and private investment. They also report the estimated effect on
employment growth and put that figure between 0.4 and 0.7 percentage points
(cumulatively over the period 2012–2014).
2Wasmer and Weil (2004) prove, in general, that in a model with endogenous search in credit and
labor markets, credit frictions amplify macroeconomic volatility through a financial accelerator.
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Other prior research has also shown a connection between financial constraints
and the labor market. In a cross-country study, Borsi (2015) finds that private credit
contractions have a sizable impact on the unemployment rate in OECD countries, in
particular in the first two years after a disruption of credit markets. Kannan (2012)
finds that stressed credit conditions constrain the pace of recovery after a recession. For
the case of Spain, Bentolila et al. (2013) use Spanish firm-level data to argue that the
weakest banks during the Great Recession caused a reduction in credit supply, and also
on employment. Our paper complements their findings by studying liquidity that is not
provided by the financial sector.
In related research, Bru¨ckner and Tuladhar (2014) estimate local government
spending multipliers using annual data for 47 Japanese prefectures during a financial
crisis in the 1990s. They break down government spending into different categories and
find that transfers to firms in the form of credit guarantees for small and medium-sized
enterprises provide the strongest effect on output. Their findings also suggest a
positive effect on the labor market: they find that government transfers to firms also
have a significant positive effect on employment and hours worked. Their identification
relies on within-prefecture variation in government expenditures and uses a
system-GMM estimation with lagged variables to mitigate endogeneity arising from
reverse causality. In contrast, our identification strategy exploits the unexpectedness
and differential size of the liquidity shock.
Other research related to ours is that of Corbi et al. (2014), who use a ‘fuzzy’
regression discontinuity design to study the effect of federal transfers on local economic
activity in Brazilian municipalities. Using local GDP measures as their outcome variable,
they find that transfers from the federal government tend to be more stimulative in
regions with a lower penetration of bank branches, which they interpret as a proxy for
tighter financial constraints. Although the lifting of financial constraints was not the
main focus, several studies have studied a related question of how stimulus spending
from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) affected US employment
using subnational geographic regions. Wilson (2012) provides an example of this kind
of work.
Turning to firm-level data, Dharmapala et al. (2011b) studied a tax holiday for
the repatriation of foreign earnings which they interpreted as an alleviation of financial
constraints. In their sample covering multinational companies they did not find any
impact on employment.
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3.3 Spain in the Great Recession: Context and
Institutional Detail
The Great Recession took a heavy toll on the Spanish labor market and, as argued by
Campos and Reggio (2015b), the unemployment rate may have fed back into domestic
demand through its effect on consumption. According to Pissarides (2013), the rise in
unemployment in Spain was an outlier when compared to other OECD countries. It
is exceptionally high when compared to the group of similar crisis-hit countries in the
periphery of the Eurozone (Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Italy and Spain). The two main
explanations that have been put forward for the surge in Spain’s unemployment rate are
the country’s two-tier labor market (Bentolila et al., 2012) and the reduction of credit
to firms (Bentolila et al., 2013).
As happened to other countries of the Eurozone, Spain suffered a credit crunch
during the Great Recession. Access to credit was difficult, in particular for small and
medium-sized firms. For example, in the second half of 2011, almost 30% of the firms
interviewed in a study by the ECB (2014) reported that access to finance was the most
pressing problem.3 On the fiscal front, the recession eroded tax bases, also at the sub-
national level. As regional and local governments saw their fiscal revenues drop, they
started to fall behind on payments to suppliers. By December 2011, commercial debt in
arrears by regional and local governments had accumulated to 3% of GDP.
Commercial arrears by sub-national governments were financially constraining
suppliers. Because a majority of suppliers were local small and medium-sized
companies, in policy circles it was thought that financial constraints were negatively
affecting the real economy and employment (IMF, 2013). The Spanish central
government responded by passing legislation on February 24 and March 9, 2012 to pay
the commercial debt in arrears. It set up a new state-owned vehicle, the Fondo para la
Financiacio´n del Pago a Proveedores (FFPP).
The FFPP was tasked with making payments directly to suppliers who were owed
money by sub-national governments. These payments were made over a two-month
period in 2012 and amounted to almost 3% of Spanish GDP.4 Legally, the stock of
commercial debt previously owed to suppliers turned into financial debt now owed to
the FFPP. Participation was mandatory for municipalities and voluntary for regional
governments. Three out of 17 regional governments (Basque Country, Galicia and
Navarre) decided not to participate in the program. In order to participate, regional
governments had to commit to a fiscal adjustment plan. Because they could not opt
3We plot the evolution of this fraction over the period 2010–2014 in Figure 3.1.
4There were three payment dates: on May 28, EUR9.3bn were transferred to suppliers of municipalities;
on June 25, EUR17.7bn were transferred to suppliers of the 14 participating regions; finally, on July
30, EUR 0.3bn were transferred to suppliers of municipalities that had been left out in the May
payment.
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out of the repayment scheme, municipalities were not required to commit to a fiscal
adjustment plan although they could voluntarily do so. If their adjustment plan was
approved by the central government, then they were given more favorable conditions
on the debt owed to the FFPP.
Funds used to pay suppliers were guaranteed by the share in national tax receipts
of each region and municipality. To repay debt to the FFPP, regions and municipalities
without an approved fiscal adjustment plan would have part of their share in national
taxes withheld over a 5-year period. On the other hand, if they secured approval of
a fiscal adjustment plan, then the money paid on their behalf could be financed at an
attractive interest rate with a 10-year loan, with a 2-year interest-only grace period. The
interest rate was set at the funding cost of the Spanish Treasury plus 115 basis points,
with an intermediation margin of 30 basis points. These were favorable conditions in
the context of 2012.
The FFPP obtained funds from a EUR 35bn syndicated loan granted by a pool
Spanish banks, including the state-owned ICO, which made the single largest
contribution. This syndicated loan was guaranteed by the Spanish government. From a
national accounting point of view, the liabilities of the FFPP became part of the stock
of outstanding general government debt.
The payment of commercial debt in arrears through the FFPP was unexpected: it
was not part of the electoral program of the Partido Popular (PP), which came into
power in the November 2011 general election. As such, it provides a quasi-experimental
setting to study the effect of relaxing financing constraints on employment variables.
The conception, communication, and execution of the program wholly took place in
2012. The first mention of this program in the press is an article in La Vanguardia in
January 2012. The legislation passed into law in February and March 2012. By July
2012, the program had been completed and the last invoices had been paid.
3.4 Data
3.4.1 Data sources
Employment and unemployment data are obtained from the standard sources.
Employment is measured as the year-end number of workers by the Spanish Social
Security Administration. These data are maintained by the Ministry of Employment
and Social Security and contain all workers affiliated to the Social Security System and
by municipality and job classification on a monthly basis from 01/2003 onward.
The number of unemployed is the year-end number of people registered as
unemployed and counted as such by the Spanish Ministry of Employment and Social
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Security. It contains the number of registered unemployed by gender, age group,
economic sector, and municipality on a monthly basis from 05/2005 onward.
We use per-capita normalizations for employment and unemployment flows. We
obtain population counts from the Continuous Census of the National Statistics Institute
(INE). This data set contains the number of residents in a municipality broken up by
gender and age for all Spanish municipalities on a yearly basis.
Data on the FFPP were obtained from the Instituto de Cre´dito Oficial (ICO), the
state-owned bank that channeled the payments to the suppliers. These data include
anonymized information for firms accounting for 48.2% of all suppliers that benefited
from this measure (64,879 out of 134,568) and almost 70% of the funds injected by the
FFPP (19 out of 27.3 billion euros). The data set includes information on the number
and amount of invoices broken down by local government, the amounts seized by the
government due to unpaid taxes and social contributions and the dates in which the
payments took place. The difference between the amount of unpaid bills and the seized
amount equals the cash the firm effectively receives. Interestingly, the data set also
matches this information to to the ZIP code of firms that are paid.
The data set does not include information on 46,564 self-employed individuals
(34.6% of suppliers and 1.5% of funds), nor on 23,125 firms (17.2% of suppliers and
29% of funds) that were not available at the Iberian Balance Sheet Analysis System
(SABI), a database with a coverage of more than 1.25 million firms in Spain which is
provided by INFORMA D&B in collaboration with Bureau Van Dijk.
Budget information on municipalities is obtained from the budget database of the
Spanish Ministry of Finance and Public Administration. This database contains the
annual budget of all Spanish municipalities for the years 2005 through 2014. Debt by
municipality is also obtained from the Spanish Ministry of Finance and Public
Administration and is available on a yearly basis from 2008 onward. The revenue of
the tax on economic activities (IAE) for each municipality is obtained from yearly
reports by the Spanish Ministry of Finance and Public Administration. These reports
contain economic activities tax revenues on a yearly basis from 2010 onward for all
municipalities with the exception of the Basque Country and Navarre.
3.4.2 Description of the liquidity shock
We normalize liquidity received by each municipality i in 2012 by the working-age
population of that municipality in 2011. Per-capita liquidity `i is defined as
`i =
Liquidity injection to municipality i in 2012
Population aged 15–64 in municipality i in 2011
. (3.1)
Figure 3.2 shows the per-capita size of shock by quartiles measured at the location
of the local administration that had the commercial debt. We call this the origin of
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the liquidity shock. Figure 3.3 shows the per-capita size of shock by quartiles measured
at the location of the legal address of the supplier. We call this the destination of the
shock.
At first sight, these figures show that the origin of the shock resembles the
destination of the shock. Geographically, there is a diagonal strip that passes North of
Madrid where the liquidity shock is weaker or non-existent. This corresponds to
municipalities that are very small in size and in population. One of the differences
between the two figures shows up when we turn to the destination of the liquidity
shock. The destination of the funds is more concentrated in large and populous areas
compared to the origin of the shock.
The first two columns in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show the characteristics of municipalities
that received liquidity versus those that did not. Because municipalities that do not
receive liquidity strongly differ in their characteristics from those that do (e.g., they
are smaller and less unpopulated), they are ill-suited for counterfactual experiments.
Controlling for the set of characteristics that are observed might be a questionable
approach to overcome selection bias because there are likely unobserved factors that
cannot be accounted for in this case. For this reason, we exclude municipalities with no
exposure to the liquidity shock from the analysis in what follows.
Next, we turn to the size of the liquidity injection. We classify all municipalities
that were exposed to a liquidity shock into two groups according to the magnitude of
per-capita liquidity they received. We set the threshold at the median, i.e., 50% of
municipalities fall into the low and high groups. The last two columns in Tables 3.1
and 3.2 compare the characteristics of municipalities that were exposed to a low versus
a high per-capita liquidity injection. Gaps in characteristics become smaller, often by an
order of magnitude, relative to the prior analysis that compared no-shock versus shock
municipalities. However, municipalities in the low and high groups still differ in some
dimensions. That is why in our later analysis we use matching on covariates to construct
a comparable control group.
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3.5 Empirical Strategy
Our unit of observation is a municipality and we use yearly data for the years 2010–2014.
This gives us a 2-year window before and after the liquidity shock that occurred in 2012.
The effect on employment and unemployment (either through direct hiring or through
spillover effects) can be located either in the municipality that owed money to a firm
(where the money originates), or in the municipality where the firm has its headquarters
(the destination of the money). We therefore explore the effects on employment and
unemployment at both the origin and the destination of the funds.
In our main analysis we exclude municipalities that did not receive FFPP funds.
The reason is that municipalities that did not receive funds are very different from the
rest of the population. These differences fall into two categories. First, non-recipient
municipalities are typically small, sparsely populated, and rural. Thus, comparisons
between municipalities with positive liquidity shocks and a zero shock do not plausibly
lead to an effect that can be argued to be causal. Second, when focusing at the origin
of the money, municipalities from the Basque Country and Navarre were excluded from
participating in the FFPP because these two regions enjoy a special tax status. Any
effect derived from a comparison between municipalities within and outside these regions
cannot be disentangled from the special fiscal status.
In Section 3.4.2 we compare recipient to non-recipient municipalities to show how
they differ on certain dimensions, such as population, labor market variables, and fiscal
variables. Our results presented in Section 3.6 rely exclusively on municipalities exposed
to a positive liquidity shock. This population is more homogeneous and selection bias is
less of an issue. In any case, we go to great lengths to rule out selection bias and other
confounding factors.
3.5.1 Outcome variables
We use two different labor market measures: employment and unemployment. Our first
outcome variable consists of employment flows normalized by working-age population in
2011, the same variable we used to normalize the liquidity variable. Employment flows
are constructed for each municipality i as
∆eit ≡ Ei,t − Ei,t−1
Ni,15−64
× 100, (3.2)
where Ei,t−1 and Ei,t are employment counts in two consecutive years and Ni,15−64 is
the working-age population in 2011, defined as the population aged between 15 and 64.
Likewise, letting Ui,t−1 and Ui,t denote the stock of unemployed in two consecutive years,
42
3 How does easing Liquidity Constraints affect Aggregate Employment?
unemployment flows in a municipality are defined as
∆uit ≡ Ui,t − Ui,t−1
Ni,15−64
× 100. (3.3)
As we explain in Section 3.4.1, employment and unemployment counts are
obtained from public sources: two different datasets maintained by the Spanish
Ministry of Employment and Social Security. Population data are obtained from the
Spanish National Statistics Institute.5
3.5.2 Specification
3.5.2.1 Benchmark specification
We use i to index municipalities, t to index time, and yit ∈ {∆eit,∆uit} to refer to any of
the outcome variables of interest. Letting `i stand for the amount of per-capita liquidity
received in 2012 under the FFPP program in municipality i, we estimate the parameter
λ in the regression:
yit = αi + λ`i × I{t>2012} + δt +Xitβ + εit, t 6= 2012. (3.6)
The interaction term λ`i × I{t>2012} captures the effect of interest. Time dummy
variables δt allow for arbitrary common time variation. Xit is a vector of time-varying
control variables that aim to capture heterogeneity in the evolution of employment and
unemployment across municipalities. In our main estimation we allow for municipality-
specific fixed effects αi and estimate this equation using the standard fixed-effects within-
estimator. We also experiment with a pooled-OLS estimation, i.e., one that imposes
5As a robustness exercise, we experimented with a second way of measuring outcome variables through
the use of symmetric growth rates. The symmetric growth rate of employment is defined by
gEt ≡
Et − Et−1
1
2Et +
1
2Et−1
× 100 (3.4)
and the symmetric growth rate of unemployment is defined by
gUt ≡
Ut − Ut−1
1
2Ut +
1
2Ut−1
× 100. (3.5)
It can be shown from the definition that the symmetric growth rate is bounded in the range
[−200, 200]. The symmetric growth rate is used mainly in the literature using establishment-level
employment microdata (see, e.g., Davis et al., 1998). It is a second-order approximation of the log
difference growth rate around zero. The symmetric growth rate’s main advantage over the usual
growth rate is that it is robust to the presence of outliers, which may pose problems in micro datasets.
All our results held for outcome variables measured in this way.
43
3 How does easing Liquidity Constraints affect Aggregate Employment?
αi = α for all i. In this case, we add a term γ`i to the right hand side of (3.6) and also
increase the number of variables in Xit, which can contain variables that are constant
by municipality. In all estimations, we use panel-robust standard errors.
Our standard set of control variables consists of population, budget variables at the
municipality level (per-capita income, per-capita expenditure and per-capita debt), and
the political landscape, measured as the number of assembly members (concejales) in
the local elections in 2007 and 2011 belonging to the three main political parties at the
time (PP, PSOE, IU). We also add an economic activity indicator, defined as per-capita
revenue of the economic activity tax (IAE) collected by municipalities. This variable is
commonly used as an indicator of economic activity at the municipal level, for example
in the influential yearly report by La Caixa.6
We include interaction terms between time dummies and dummies for regions
(CCAA). These interaction terms will capture any time-varying effects that are
common by CCAA. The reason for including these terms is that at the same time of
the FFPP plan to municipalities, there was similar plan designed for CCAA. In
addition, because the liquidity injection occurred during 2012 it is unclear whether this
year is already affected by the liquidity injection. We decided to exclude this year from
our estimations in the benchmark equation. However, as we show below, the year 2012
can be included in a more flexible model.
3.5.2.2 Flexible specification
Because we have two periods prior to the liquidity injection and two periods after it,
we can estimate a more flexible specification. As argued by Mora and Reggio (2012)
and Mora and Reggio (2015), there are advantages to replacing the dummy variable
indicating the period before and after the occurrence of the shock with a more flexible
specification. Their argument is made for binary treatment variables but the intuition
carries over to a our continuous variable measuring liquidity.
In the flexible specification the single interaction term λ`i × I{t>2012} in (3.6) is
replaced with four yearly interaction terms, so that the equation to be estimated
becomes
yit = αi +
2014∑
τ=2011
λτ`i × I{t=τ} + δt +Xitβ + εit. (3.7)
Otherwise, we include the same controls as those of our benchmark specification.
Our interest in this specification lies in the estimation of the coefficients λ2011, λ2012,
λ2013, and λ2014 (the year 2010 is the excluded category). This flexible specification has
6In this report, La Caixa reports data only for the largest 3,245 municipalities out of a total of roughly
8,100 municipalities in Spain. We therefore obtain IAE tax revenue by municipality directly from
yearly reports by the Spanish Ministry of Finance and Public Administration, as explained in our
section on data sources.
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a number of advantages over the standard specification in (3.6). As argued by Mora and
Reggio (2012), our specification does not directly impose a common-trend assumption
on labor market variables before 2012. In fact, the flexible specification allows to test
whether the years 2010 and 2011 differ in terms of the evolution of labor market variables
by performing a simple t-test on the coefficient estimated for λ2011.
There are two additional advantages from the flexible model. The first advantage
is that the year 2012 can be included without having to decide whether it is affected
by the shock. The data are allowed to speak for themselves. The second advantage is
that the effect of the liquidity injection is not constrained to be constant over the whole
treatment period, i.e., this flexible model allows for the possibility that λ2013 6= λ2014.
3.5.2.3 Binary specification
In addition to the continuous variable `i, we also estimate specifications of the form
yit = αi + λHI{`i∈LH} × I{t>2012} + δt +Xitβ + εit, t 6= 2012, (3.8)
and
yit = αi +
2014∑
τ=2011
λτHI{`i∈LH} × I{t=τ} + δt +Xitβ + εit, (3.9)
where I{`i∈LH} is an indicator of whether liquidity ` in municipality i belongs to a
group of high liquidity recipients. We considered different definitions of the group LH ,
such as the top half of the sample, the top quartile, etc.
The drawback of this approach is that by transforming our variable of interest into
a discrete variable with broad categories the estimation may be losing precision. The
advantage of the approach is that we can use standard tools derived for binary treatment
variables to study whether heterogeneity in the covariate distribution is biasing the
estimated effect of the liquidity shock.
3.5.2.4 Matching on covariates
As highlighted by Imbens (2004), the estimation of average treatment effects is sensitive
to differences in the covariate distribution. The specifications of the form (3.8) and (3.9)
allow us to perform matching on covariates. We use propensity score matching to select
a single match for each of the municipalities in the high group LH . According to Imbens
and Wooldridge (2009), this leads to credible inference with the least bias, at the cost
of sacrificing some precision. Matching is done with replacement, so that the same
municipality outside of the high group LH can perform as a match for more than one
observation in the LH group. We match on covariates for the year 2010. As a general
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rule, we use variables in levels and add their squares only if they improve the results of
the the matching algorithm
For our matching variables we used the logarithm of the population, budget
variables, and the per-capita tax on economic activity. In addition to these variables
we also included the geographical location of each municipality represented as the
centroid of the 2-dimensional coordinates of each municipality on a map in geospatial
vector data format. As argued by Heckman et al. (1998) geographically-matched
controls greatly reduce the potential selection bias, especially in the presence of
heterogeneous effects. We found that matching for the destination of funds was greatly
improved by also adding the employment rate measured in 2010. The results of the
matching procedure can be seen in Section 3.8.5. Despite the reduced set of variables
that were used in the matching procedure, we observe that the match is very good for
the year 2010, and also for the year 2011.
We estimate the specification for the binary treatment variable in (3.8) and (3.9) for
the original sample and for the sample matched on covariates. Our estimations include
the same controls as those of our continuous variable specification.
3.6 Results
Our results using the empirical strategy laid out in Section 3.5 suggest that liquidity
provision had significant effects on unemployment and employment both at the origin
of the liquidity injection and at the destination of of liquidity. Our results are presented
in a series of tables shown in the Appendix. The main conclusion is that the effect on
unemployment is stronger at the origin than at the destination whereas the effect on
employment is stronger at the destination. Moreover, there is evidence indicating that
the effect on employment carries over into 2014 at the destination.
3.6.1 The fully flexible specification
The effect on unemployment is reported in two tables. Table 3.3 measures the liquidity
shock at the location where suppliers were owed the money, i.e., at municipalities that
had their invoices in arrears repaid through the FFPP program. Table 3.4 measures
the location at the destination of funds, the municipality where suppliers had their
legal address. Coefficients in columns 1 and 2 are multiplied by 1,000. Therefore, they
measure changes in the number of unemployed individuals per EUR 1,000 that flow into
a municipality.
We are most interested in the results of the continuous flexible specification
(Column 2) and the binary specification with the matched sample (Column 6).
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According to the continuous specification there is a significant effect on unemployment
only at the origin of funds. In fact, this effect is negative and significantly different
from zero only in 2013. At the destination there does not seem to be any effect in the
continuous specification.
Things change in the binary specification (Column 4). These results for the whole
sample show a significantly negative effect on unemployment in 2013 and 2014, if the
location of the origin is considered. When we use the sample that is matched on
covariates (Column 6), the significance is reduced although point estimates remain
virtually unchanged.
The first look at unemployment in the fully flexible model suggests that the effect
is clearer at the origin of funds.
Notably, the coefficients on λ2011 are not significantly different from zero. We
therefore later fit a reduced model that imposes λ2010 = λ2011.
Before doing so, we turn to employment. Table 3.5 focuses on the origin and
Table 3.6 on the destination of funds.
The continuous specification (Column 2) shows significant positive effects on
employment in 2013 at the origin and in 2013 and 2014 at the destination. The
estimation at the origin also shows a large point estimate for 2012 which is not
significantly different from zero. The effect measured at the destination seems to be
stronger and more persistent than at the origin.
This overall result is maintained when we turn to the binary specification, although
significance is reduced. Focusing on the matched sample (Column 6), we find that at the
destination the matching procedure has eliminated the large and significant coefficient
on λ2011. Again, this is evidence in favor of a more parsimonious model in which λ2010 =
λ2011.
We now turn to a reduced model that imposes λ2010 = λ2011.
3.6.2 A flexible specification with λ2010 = λ2011
Results of imposing λ2010 = λ2011 are shown in Tables 3.7 through Tables 3.10. This
specification yields results that are qualitatively similar to those for the fully flexible
model. However, the precision with which the coefficients are estimated is larger.
There are two main conclusions from these results. First, the evidence for a
reduction of unemployment is stronger at the origin whereas the evidence for an
increase of employment is stronger at the destination. Second, there are differences in
timing. Effects do not persist into 2014 in the same way at the origin and at the
destination.
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3.6.3 Robustness checks
We conducted several robustness checks. In addition to the fixed-effects specification, we
estimated all our equations using a pooled-OLS estimator (clustering standard errors by
municipality). We obtained results that were qualitatively similar although, in general,
with smaller estimated standard errors, and therefore higher statistical significance. In
this sense, our fixed-effects results are the more conservative choice.
We conducted several robustness checks on our matching procedure, as well. We
changed the caliper from our preferred value of 0.005 to smaller and larger values and
obtained overall similar results. We also explored using other variables in the matching
procedure but the use of groups of variables that delivered a fit comparable with our
preferred case delivered similar results.
3.7 Conclusion
We find that the liquidity injection had effects both at originating and destination
municipalities. However, the size and timing of the effects are different. At the origin,
there was a strong reduction in 2013 that persists until 2014. At the destination, the
effect is weaker and concentrated in 2013. In comparison, the effect on employment
was stronger and more persistent at the destination.
Our preliminary findings suggest that the liquidity injection in 2012, and the
elimination of financial constraints it implied, had a plausibly causal effect on labor
market outcomes. Our results are a first step in attempting to study the effect of the
FFPP program on employment and unemployment. The objective is to obtain
estimates that can be argued to be of a causal nature. For this, further work is needed
in order to weed out potential selection bias.
More generally, our findings address the effect of “financial frictions” and “financial
shocks” on employment that were brought to the highlight by the recent financial crisis,
and which are now routinely used in economic models. We do so by using micro data at
the municipality level. Our preliminary findings suggest that the strong effects on the
real economy predicted by economic theory are validated once the geographical origin
and destination of funds is considered.
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3.8 Figures and Tables
Figure 3.1 Fraction of small and medium-sized firms in Spain mentioning access to finance
as the most pressing problem over the period 2010–2014 (constructed from the
ECB series SAFE.H.ES.SME.A.0.0.0.Q0.ZZZZ.P3.AL.WP)
49
3 How does easing Liquidity Constraints affect Aggregate Employment?
Figure 3.2 Per-capita size of shock by quartiles measured at the location of the local
administration that had the commercial debt (Origin). Canary Islands are not
included to preserve the scale.
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Figure 3.3 Per-capita size of shock by quartiles measured at the location of the legal address
of the supplier (Destination). Canary Islands are not included to preserve the
scale.
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Table 3.1 Summary Statistics (origin: municipality where funds are paid).
No Shock Shock Low High
Per-capita FFPP injection 0.00 527.17 132.31 922.44
(0.00) (854.68) (86.65) (1068.69)
Population 2650.00 9393.11 10085.54 8699.95
(27105.27) (62892.03) (36406.21) (81174.62)
Unemployment rate 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.12
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Employment rate 0.42 0.39 0.40 0.38
(0.35) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19)
Fraction of population aged 15-64 0.60 0.63 0.64 0.63
(0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
Percentage PSOE 0.29 0.35 0.35 0.35
(0.23) (0.19) (0.18) (0.20)
Percentage PP 0.41 0.38 0.38 0.38
(0.30) (0.22) (0.21) (0.23)
Percentage IU 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.04
(0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09)
Per-capita IAE (EUR/N) 73.69 30.37 28.09 32.66
(365.27) (192.02) (89.90) (256.32)
Per-capita debt (EUR/N) 294.45 513.49 414.79 612.29
(717.72) (592.68) (471.29) (679.13)
Per-capita revenue (EUR/N) 2560.45 1938.81 1678.11 2200.48
(3166.87) (1428.03) (924.00) (1758.83)
Per-capita expenditure (EUR/N) 2501.77 1981.47 1701.21 2262.77
(2435.56) (1473.06) (936.25) (1819.66)
Observations 4326 3784 1892 1892
This table reports summary statistics of municipality-year observations in 2011 for the entire sample. The data is
classified according to the origin of the funds, this is, regarding the municipality that owed the arrears to the firms.
Municipalities are classified as “No Shock“ (column 1) if they do not participate in the FFPP, and they are classified as
“Shock” (column 2) if they do participate in the FFPP. Municipalities in column 2 are divided into two groups according
to the median per-capita liquidity they received, the lower group results appear in column 3 and the higher group results
appear in column 4. Per-capita FFPP injection is measured as the liquidity injected in a municipality divided by working
age population. Population is the amount of people registered in the census of the municipality. Unemployment rate is
the ratio of unemployed population to working age population. Employment rate is the ratio of employed population to
working age population. Fraction of population aged 15-64 is the percentage of population aged 15-64. Percentage PSOE,
Percentage PP and Percentage IU are the percentage of total votes received by PSOE, PP and IU in the 2011 municipal
elections. Per-capita IAE, Per-capita debt, Per-capita revenue and Per-capita expenditure measure the municipal revenue
from the IAE (tax on economic activities), the municipal debt, total municipal revenues and total municipal expenditures
normalized by working age population. Numbers reported are cross-sectional averages and standard errors in parentheses.
Number of observations appear in the last row.
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Table 3.2 Summary Statistics (destination: municipality where firms are headquartered).
No Shock Shock Low High
Per-capita FFPP injection 0.00 158.26 13.43 303.18
(0.00) (678.50) (10.85) (937.62)
Population 757.29 12758.99 7618.61 17902.40
(2566.44) (72550.32) (18973.31) (100599.03)
Unemployment rate 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.12
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Employment rate 0.38 0.44 0.42 0.46
(0.30) (0.26) (0.24) (0.29)
Fraction of population aged 15-64 0.59 0.65 0.65 0.65
(0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Percentage PSOE 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.33
(0.24) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Percentage PP 0.43 0.36 0.35 0.37
(0.29) (0.21) (0.22) (0.21)
Percentage IU 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.05
(0.07) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
Per-capita IAE (EUR/N) 59.10 43.00 39.53 46.40
(288.66) (297.85) (148.81) (392.12)
Per-capita debt (EUR/N) 325.88 494.43 458.42 530.45
(727.72) (570.10) (504.28) (627.19)
Per-capita revenue (EUR/N) 2702.09 1674.52 1635.11 1713.96
(3155.50) (933.24) (796.59) (1051.13)
Per-capita expenditure (EUR/N) 2673.17 1687.32 1640.15 1734.52
(2504.43) (938.40) (775.39) (1075.26)
Observations 4705 3405 1703 1702
This table reports summary statistics of municipality-year observations in 2011 for the entire sample. The data is
classified according to the destination of the funds, this is, regarding the headquarters of the firms. Municipalities are
classified as “No Shock“ (column 1) if they do not participate in the FFPP, and they are classified as “Shock” (column
2) if they do participate in the FFPP. Municipalities in column 2 are divided into two groups according to the median
per-capita liquidity they received, the lower group results appear in column 3 and the higher group results appear in
column 4. Per-capita FFPP injection is measured as the liquidity injected in a municipality divided by working age
population. Population is the amount of people registered in the census of the municipality. Unemployment rate is the
ratio of unemployed population to working age population. Employment rate is the ratio of employed population to
working age population. Fraction of population aged 15-64 is the percentage of population aged 15-64. Percentage PSOE,
Percentage PP and Percentage IU are the percentage of total votes received by PSOE, PP and IU in the 2011 municipal
elections. Per-capita IAE, Per-capita debt, Per-capita revenue and Per-capita expenditure measure the municipal revenue
from the IAE (tax on economic activities), the municipal debt, total municipal revenues and total municipal expenditures
normalized by working age population. Numbers reported are cross-sectional averages and standard errors in parentheses.
Number of observations appear in the last row.
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3.8.1 Results for Unemployment (Fixed Effects)
Table 3.3 Effect on ∆u (Origin).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Benchmark Flexible Binary Binary Flex Matched Matched Flex
λ≥2013 -0.104*
(0.059)
λ2011 -0.076
(0.098)
λ2012 -0.099
(0.082)
λ2013 -0.193**
(0.088)
λ2014 -0.103
(0.104)
λ≥2013H -0.182*** -0.210**
(0.058) (0.084)
λ2011H -0.129 -0.072
(0.107) (0.161)
λ2012H -0.134 -0.105
(0.097) (0.140)
λ2013H -0.264*** -0.260*
(0.096) (0.148)
λ2014H -0.240** -0.233
(0.097) (0.145)
Observations 14,671 18,339 14,671 18,339 13,995 17,494
R-squared 0.207 0.219 0.207 0.219 0.197 0.210
Number of id 3,668 3,668 3,668 3,668 2,685 2,685
This table presents estimates from panel regressions explaining unemployment change where the
liquidity injection originates for the period 2010 to 2014. The dependent variable is unemployment
and measured as indicated in Section 3.5.2.1. All columns show results following the specification
explained in Section 3.6.1. Column 1 shows results following the specification detailed in Section
3.5.2.1 and λ≥2013 is the coefficient that interacts the liquidity shock and a dummy variable that
takes value 1 for the period 2013-14. Column 2 reports results for the flexible specification explained
in Section 3.5.2.2 in which the omitted yearly dummy is 2010. λ2011, λ2012, λ2013, λ2014 report
coefficients for the interactions of the liquidity shock and yearly dummies in 2011, 2012, 2013 and
2014 respectively. Column 3 reports results following the specification detailed in Section 3.5.2.3
in which λ≥2013H is the coefficient that interacts the binary liquidity shock dummy and a dummy
variable for the period 2013-14. Column 4 reports results for the binary specification explained in
Section 3.5.2.3 where λ2011H , λ
2012
H , λ
2013
H and λ
2014
H are the coefficients that interact the binary
liquidity shock dummy and dummies for the years 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014 respectively. Columns
5 and 6 follow the specification explained in Section 3.5.2.4. The difference with results of columns 3
and 4 is that in columns 5 and 6 the matched sample is used and therefore there are less observations.
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Table 3.4 Effect on ∆u (Destination).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Benchmark Flexible Binary Binary Flex Matched Matched Flex
λ≥2013 -0.043
(0.053)
λ2011 0.049
(0.086)
λ2012 0.077
(0.139)
λ2013 -0.118
(0.098)
λ2014 0.073
(0.115)
λ≥2013H -0.078* -0.138**
(0.047) (0.061)
λ2011H 0.023 0.073
(0.084) (0.105)
λ2012H -0.004 0.056
(0.077) (0.126)
λ2013H -0.025 -0.135
(0.076) (0.101)
λ2014H -0.109 -0.073
(0.074) (0.099)
Observations 13,087 16,359 13,087 16,359 12,824 16,030
R-squared 0.307 0.327 0.307 0.327 0.302 0.312
Number of id 3,272 3,272 3,272 3,272 2,453 2,453
This table presents estimates from panel regressions explaining unemployment change in the
municipality where the firms that receive the liquidity injection are located for the period 2010
to 2014. The dependent variable is unemployment and measured as indicated in Section 3.5.2.1.
All columns show results following the specification explained in Section 3.6.1. Column 1 shows
results following the specification detailed in Section 3.5.2.1 and λ≥2013 is the coefficient that
interacts the liquidity shock and a dummy variable that takes value 1 for the period 2013-14.
Column 2 reports results for the flexible specification explained in Section 3.5.2.2 in which the
omitted yearly dummy is 2010. λ2011, λ2012, λ2013, λ2014 report coefficients for the interactions
of the liquidity shock and yearly dummies in 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014 respectively. Column
3 reports results following the specification detailed in Section 3.5.2.3 in which λ≥2013H is the
coefficient that interacts the binary liquidity shock dummy and a dummy variable for the period
2013-14. Column 4 reports results for the binary specification explained in Section 3.5.2.3 where
λ2011H , λ
2012
H , λ
2013
H and λ
2014
H are the coefficients that interact the binary liquidity shock dummy
and dummies for the years 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014 respectively. Columns 5 and 6 follow the
specification explained in Section 3.5.2.4. The difference with results of columns 3 and 4 is that
in columns 5 and 6 the matched sample is used and therefore there are less observations.
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3.8.2 Results for Employment (Fixed Effects)
Table 3.5 Effect on ∆e (Origin).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Benchmark Flexible Binary Binary Flex Matched Matched Flex
λ≥2013 0.102
(0.093)
λ2011 0.180
(0.123)
λ2012 0.171
(0.116)
λ2013 0.232*
(0.126)
λ2014 0.161
(0.137)
λ≥2013H 0.166 0.208
(0.128) (0.173)
λ2011H -0.096 -0.098
(0.212) (0.277)
λ2012H 0.314 0.307
(0.206) (0.280)
λ2013H 0.331* 0.342
(0.196) (0.248)
λ2014H -0.080 -0.015
(0.183) (0.229)
Observations 14,605 18,257 14,605 18,257 13,915 17,401
R-squared 0.053 0.079 0.053 0.080 0.060 0.085
Number of id 3,660 3,661 3,660 3,661 2,680 2,681
This table presents estimates from panel regressions explaining employment change where the
liquidity injection originates for the period 2010 to 2014. The dependent variable is employment
and measured as indicated in Section 3.5.2.1. All columns show results following the specification
explained in Section 3.6.1. Column 1 shows results following the specification detailed in Section
3.5.2.1 and λ≥2013 is the coefficient that interacts the liquidity shock and a dummy variable
that takes value 1 for the period 2013-14. Column 2 reports results for the flexible specification
explained in Section 3.5.2.2 in which the omitted yearly dummy is 2010. λ2011, λ2012, λ2013, λ2014
report coefficients for the interactions of the liquidity shock and yearly dummies in 2011, 2012,
2013 and 2014 respectively. Column 3 reports results following the specification detailed in Section
3.5.2.3 in which λ≥2013H is the coefficient that interacts the binary liquidity shock dummy and
a dummy variable for the period 2013-14. Column 4 reports results for the binary specification
explained in Section 3.5.2.3 where λ2011H , λ
2012
H , λ
2013
H and λ
2014
H are the coefficients that interact
the binary liquidity shock dummy and dummies for the years 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014
respectively. Columns 5 and 6 follow the specification explained in Section 3.5.2.4. The difference
with results of columns 3 and 4 is that in columns 5 and 6 the matched sample is used and
therefore there are less observations.
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Table 3.6 Effect on ∆e (Destination).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Benchmark Flexible Binary Binary Flex Matched Matched Flex
λ≥2013 0.511**
(0.242)
λ2011 -0.044
(0.373)
λ2012 -0.232
(0.209)
λ2013 0.458**
(0.212)
λ2014 0.520**
(0.246)
λ≥2013H 0.357*** 0.460**
(0.126) (0.199)
λ2011H -0.494** -0.174
(0.206) (0.248)
λ2012H -0.199 0.176
(0.225) (0.294)
λ2013H -0.166 0.334
(0.199) (0.264)
λ2014H 0.386** 0.412*
(0.190) (0.249)
Observations 13,065 16,330 13,065 16,330 12,821 16,026
R-squared 0.074 0.101 0.073 0.100 0.084 0.116
Number of id 3,270 3,270 3,270 3,270 2,453 2,453
This table presents estimates from panel regressions explaining employment change in the
municipality where the firms that receive the liquidity injection are located for the period 2010
to 2014. The dependent variable is employment and measured as indicated in Section 3.5.2.1. All
columns show results following the specification explained in Section 3.6.1. Column 1 shows results
following the specification detailed in Section 3.5.2.1 and λ≥2013 is the coefficient that interacts the
liquidity shock and a dummy variable that takes value 1 for the period 2013-14. Column 2 reports
results for the flexible specification explained in Section 3.5.2.2 in which the omitted yearly dummy
is 2010. λ2011, λ2012, λ2013, λ2014 report coefficients for the interactions of the liquidity shock and
yearly dummies in 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014 respectively. Column 3 reports results following the
specification detailed in Section 3.5.2.3 in which λ≥2013H is the coefficient that interacts the binary
liquidity shock dummy and a dummy variable for the period 2013-14. Column 4 reports results for
the binary specification explained in Section 3.5.2.3 where λ2011H , λ
2012
H , λ
2013
H and λ
2014
H are the
coefficients that interact the binary liquidity shock dummy and dummies for the years 2011, 2012,
2013 and 2014 respectively. Columns 5 and 6 follow the specification explained in Section 3.5.2.4.
The difference with results of columns 3 and 4 is that in columns 5 and 6 the matched sample is
used and therefore there are less observations.
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3.8.3 Results for Unemployment (Fixed Effects, λ2010 = λ2011)
Table 3.7 Effect on ∆u (Origin).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Benchmark Flexible Matched Matched Flex
λ≥2013 -0.104*
(0.059)
λ2012 -0.061
(0.058)
λ2013 -0.155**
(0.062)
λ2014 -0.064
(0.074)
λ≥2013H -0.210**
(0.084)
λ2012H -0.069
(0.112)
λ2013H -0.224*
(0.117)
λ2014H -0.198*
(0.111)
Observations 14,671 18,339 13,995 17,494
R-squared 0.207 0.219 0.197 0.210
Number of id 3,668 3,668 2,685 2,685
This table presents estimates from panel regressions explaining
unemployment change where the liquidity injection originates for the
period 2010 to 2014. The dependent variable is unemployment and
measured as indicated in Section 3.5.2.1. All columns show results
following the specification explained in Section 3.6.2. Column 1 shows
results following the specification detailed in Section 3.5.2.1 and λ≥2013
is the coefficient that interacts the liquidity shock and a dummy variable
that takes value 1 for the period 2013-14. Column 2 reports results for
the flexible specification explained in Section 3.5.2.2 in which the omitted
period dummy is 2010-2011. λ2012, λ2013, λ2014 report coefficients for
the interactions of the liquidity shock and yearly dummies in 2012,
2013 and 2014 respectively. Column 3 reports results following the
specification detailed in Section 3.5.2.3 in which λ≥2013H is the coefficient
that interacts the binary liquidity shock dummy and a dummy variable
for the period 2013-14. Column 4 reports results for the binary
specification explained in Section 3.5.2.3 where λ2012H , λ
2013
H and λ
2014
H
are the coefficients that interact the binary liquidity shock dummy and
dummies for the years 2012, 2013 and 2014 respectively. Columns 5 and
6 follow the specification explained in Section 3.5.2.4. The difference
with results of columns 3 and 4 is that in columns 5 and 6 the matched
sample is used and therefore there are less observations.
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Table 3.8 Effect on ∆u (Destination).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Benchmark Flexible Matched Matched Flex
λ≥2013 -0.043
(0.053)
λ2012 0.053
(0.122)
λ2013 -0.142
(0.097)
λ2014 0.049
(0.085)
λ≥2013H -0.138**
(0.061)
λ2012H 0.020
(0.118)
λ2013H -0.171**
(0.085)
λ2014H -0.109
(0.090)
Observations 13,087 16,359 12,824 16,030
R-squared 0.307 0.327 0.302 0.312
Number of id 3,272 3,272 2,453 2,453
This table presents estimates from panel regressions explaining
unemployment change in the municipality where the firms that receive
the liquidity injection are located for the period 2010 to 2014. The
dependent variable is unemployment and measured as indicated in
Section 3.5.2.1. All columns show results following the specification
explained in Section 3.6.2. Column 1 shows results following the
specification detailed in Section 3.5.2.1 and λ≥2013 is the coefficient
that interacts the liquidity shock and a dummy variable that takes
value 1 for the period 2013-14. Column 2 reports results for the
flexible specification explained in Section 3.5.2.2 in which the omitted
period dummy is 2010-2011. λ2012, λ2013, λ2014 report coefficients for
the interactions of the liquidity shock and yearly dummies in 2012,
2013 and 2014 respectively. Column 3 reports results following the
specification detailed in Section 3.5.2.3 in which λ≥2013H is the coefficient
that interacts the binary liquidity shock dummy and a dummy variable
for the period 2013-14. Column 4 reports results for the binary
specification explained in Section 3.5.2.3 where λ2012H , λ
2013
H and λ
2014
H
are the coefficients that interact the binary liquidity shock dummy and
dummies for the years 2012, 2013 and 2014 respectively. Columns 5 and
6 follow the specification explained in Section 3.5.2.4. The difference
with results of columns 3 and 4 is that in columns 5 and 6 the matched
sample is used and therefore there are less observations.
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3.8.4 Results for Employment (Fixed Effects, λ2010 = λ2011)
Table 3.9 Effect on ∆e (Origin).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Benchmark Flexible Matched Matched Flex
λ≥2013 0.102
(0.093)
λ2012 0.081
(0.099)
λ2013 0.142
(0.107)
λ2014 0.071
(0.111)
λ≥2013H 0.208
(0.173)
λ2012H 0.356
(0.250)
λ2013H 0.391*
(0.218)
λ2014H 0.034
(0.198)
Observations 14,605 18,257 13,915 17,401
R-squared 0.053 0.079 0.060 0.085
Number of id 3,660 3,661 2,680 2,681
This table presents estimates from panel regressions explaining
employment change where the liquidity injection originates for the
period 2010 to 2014. The dependent variable is employment and
measured as indicated in Section 3.5.2.1. All columns show results
following the specification explained in Section 3.6.2. Column 1 shows
results following the specification detailed in Section 3.5.2.1 and λ≥2013
is the coefficient that interacts the liquidity shock and a dummy
variable that takes value 1 for the period 2013-14. Column 2 reports
results for the flexible specification explained in Section 3.5.2.2 in which
the omitted period dummy is 2010-2011. λ2012, λ2013, λ2014 report
coefficients for the interactions of the liquidity shock and yearly dummies
in 2012, 2013 and 2014 respectively. Column 3 reports results following
the specification detailed in Section 3.5.2.3 in which λ≥2013H is the
coefficient that interacts the binary liquidity shock dummy and a dummy
variable for the period 2013-14. Column 4 reports results for the binary
specification explained in Section 3.5.2.3 where λ2012H , λ
2013
H and λ
2014
H
are the coefficients that interact the binary liquidity shock dummy and
dummies for the years 2012, 2013 and 2014 respectively. Columns 5 and
6 follow the specification explained in Section 3.5.2.4. The difference
with results of columns 3 and 4 is that in columns 5 and 6 the matched
sample is used and therefore there are less observations.
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Table 3.10 Effect on ∆e (Destination).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Benchmark Flexible Matched Matched Flex
λ≥2013 0.511**
(0.242)
λ2012 -0.210
(0.236)
λ2013 0.481**
(0.200)
λ2014 0.542*
(0.325)
λ≥2013H 0.460**
(0.199)
λ2012H 0.263
(0.256)
λ2013H 0.421*
(0.238)
λ2014H 0.499**
(0.217)
Observations 13,065 16,330 12,821 16,026
R-squared 0.074 0.101 0.084 0.116
Number of id 3,270 3,270 2,453 2,453
This table presents estimates from panel regressions explaining
employment change in the municipality where the firms that receive
the liquidity injection are located for the period 2010 to 2014. The
dependent variable is employment and measured as indicated in Section
3.5.2.1. All columns show results following the specification explained
in Section 3.6.2. Column 1 shows results following the specification
detailed in Section 3.5.2.1 and λ≥2013 is the coefficient that interacts the
liquidity shock and a dummy variable that takes value 1 for the period
2013-14. Column 2 reports results for the flexible specification explained
in Section 3.5.2.2 in which the omitted period dummy is 2010-2011.
λ2012, λ2013, λ2014 report coefficients for the interactions of the liquidity
shock and yearly dummies in 2012, 2013 and 2014 respectively. Column
3 reports results following the specification detailed in Section 3.5.2.3
in which λ≥2013H is the coefficient that interacts the binary liquidity
shock dummy and a dummy variable for the period 2013-14. Column 4
reports results for the binary specification explained in Section 3.5.2.3
where λ2012H , λ
2013
H and λ
2014
H are the coefficients that interact the binary
liquidity shock dummy and dummies for the years 2012, 2013 and 2014
respectively. Columns 5 and 6 follow the specification explained in
Section 3.5.2.4. The difference with results of columns 3 and 4 is that
in columns 5 and 6 the matched sample is used and therefore there are
less observations.
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3.8.5 Quality of the matching procedure
Table 3.11 Quality of the match in 2010 (Origin)
Low (U) High (U) Low (M) High (M)
X coordinate 0.46 0.52 0.54 0.52
(0.32) (0.28) (0.33) (0.28)
Y coordinate 4.43 4.42 4.41 4.42
(0.28) (0.24) (0.27) (0.24)
Population 10054.49 9186.97 10842.75 9333.35
(36420.56) (83762.62) (38656.84) (84563.89)
Unemployment rate 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Employment rate 0.38 0.37 0.39 0.37
(0.17) (0.18) (0.16) (0.18)
Fraction of population aged 15-64 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.69
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Percentage PSOE 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.35
(0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19)
Percentage PP 0.38 0.37 0.35 0.37
(0.21) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22)
Percentage IU 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
Per-capita IAE (EUR/N) 24.85 30.44 30.67 27.42
(76.46) (233.33) (90.91) (212.54)
Per-capita debt (EUR/N) 386.99 581.12 538.24 546.21
(458.65) (621.33) (534.77) (545.14)
Per-capita revenue (EUR/N) 1870.70 2249.49 2164.13 2191.76
(1176.63) (1478.85) (1447.96) (1350.39)
Per-capita expenditure (EUR/N) 1848.50 2229.28 2135.79 2177.64
(1143.76) (1409.99) (1405.68) (1309.01)
Observations 1892 1784 936 1750
This table reports summary statistics of municipality-year observations in 2010. The data is
classified according to the origin of the funds, this is, according to the municipality that owed
money to the firm. Municipalities are classified as “Low“ (column 1 and 3) if the money
received is below the median per-capita liquidity received by all municipalities and they
are classified as “High” (column 2 and 4) otherwise. Columns 1 and 2 present raw results
before the matching is implemented. Columns 3 and 4 present results after the matching
is realized. X and Y coordinate geographically locate each municipality, population is the
amount of people registered in the census of the municipality, unemployment rate is the
ratio of unemployed population to working age population, employment rate is the ratio
of employed population to working age population, fraction of population aged 15-64 is the
percentage of population aged 15-64, percentage PSOE, percentage PP and percentage IU are
the percentage of total votes received by PSOE, PP and IU in the 2011 municipal elections,
per-capita IAE, per-capita debt, per-capita revenue and per-capita expenditure measure the
municipal revenue from the IAE (tax on economic activities), the municipal debt, total
municipal revenues and total municipal expenditures normalized by working age population.
Numbers reported are cross-sectional averages and standard errors in parentheses. Number
of observations appear in the last row.
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Table 3.12 Quality of the match in 2011 (Origin)
Low (U) High (U) Low (M) High (M)
X coordinate 0.46 0.52 0.54 0.52
(0.32) (0.28) (0.33) (0.28)
Y coordinate 4.43 4.42 4.41 4.42
(0.28) (0.24) (0.27) (0.24)
Population 10085.54 9218.34 10891.67 9364.78
(36406.21) (83546.39) (38663.79) (84345.44)
Unemployment rate 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Employment rate 0.40 0.39 0.41 0.39
(0.18) (0.19) (0.17) (0.19)
Fraction of population aged 15-64 0.64 0.63 0.64 0.63
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Percentage PSOE 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.35
(0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19)
Percentage PP 0.38 0.37 0.35 0.37
(0.21) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22)
Percentage IU 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
Per-capita IAE (EUR/N) 28.09 34.28 33.89 31.24
(89.90) (263.78) (102.59) (245.31)
Per-capita debt (EUR/N) 414.79 622.12 568.97 587.81
(471.29) (645.67) (537.78) (571.68)
Per-capita revenue (EUR/N) 1678.11 2022.59 1827.10 1989.77
(924.00) (1277.59) (961.62) (1236.53)
Per-capita expenditure (EUR/N) 1701.21 2068.49 1858.45 2028.51
(936.25) (1292.66) (994.25) (1233.49)
Observations 1893 1784 936 1750
This table reports summary statistics of municipality-year observations in 2011 for the entire sample.
The data is classified according to the origin of the funds, this is, according to the municipality that owed
money to the firm. Municipalities are classified as “Low“ (column 1 and 3) if the money received is below
the median per-capita liquidity received by all municipalities and they are classified as “High” (column 2
and 4) otherwise. Columns 1 and 2 present raw results before the matching is implemented. Columns 3
and 4 present results after the matching is realized. X coordinate and Y coordinate geographically locate
each municipality and represent the centroid of the 2-dimensional coordinates of each municipality on
a map in geospatial vector data format, population is the amount of people registered in the census of
the municipality, unemployment rate is the ratio of unemployed population to working age population,
employment rate is the ratio of employed population to working age population, fraction of population
aged 15-64 is the percentage of population aged 15-64, percentage PSOE, percentage PP and percentage IU
are the percentage of total votes received by PSOE, PP and IU in the 2011 municipal elections, per-capita
IAE, per-capita debt, per-capita revenue and per-capita expenditure measure the municipal revenue from
the IAE (tax on economic activities), the municipal debt, total municipal revenues and total municipal
expenditures normalized by working age population. Numbers reported are cross-sectional averages and
standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations appear in the last row.
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Table 3.13 Quality of the match in 2010 (Destination)
Low (U) High (U) Low (M) High (M)
X coordinate 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.48
(0.34) (0.31) (0.39) (0.31)
Y coordinate 4.47 4.41 4.41 4.41
(0.28) (0.28) (0.33) (0.28)
Population 7585.60 18128.60 11653.83 10142.93
(18933.18) (101587.07) (25638.01) (21029.69)
Unemployment rate 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Employment rate 0.40 0.44 0.42 0.42
(0.22) (0.28) (0.19) (0.20)
Fraction of population aged 15-64 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Percentage PSOE 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.34
(0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18)
Percentage PP 0.35 0.37 0.35 0.37
(0.22) (0.20) (0.22) (0.20)
Percentage IU 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
Per-capita IAE (EUR/N) 34.61 39.82 28.40 30.21
(138.11) (359.90) (53.88) (93.19)
Per-capita debt (EUR/N) 429.78 501.32 436.17 490.19
(469.10) (605.67) (435.17) (598.74)
Per-capita revenue (EUR/N) 1791.45 1861.00 1826.57 1859.84
(906.36) (1141.90) (1021.59) (1143.65)
Per-capita expenditure (EUR/N) 1759.01 1853.52 1783.38 1853.84
(865.34) (1101.19) (990.05) (1105.94)
Observations 1703 1676 851 1605
This table reports summary statistics of municipality-year observations in 2010 for the entire sample. The
data is classified according to the destination of the funds, this is, according to the municipality where the
firms that receive the money have their headquarters. Municipalities are classified as “Low“ (column 1 and
3) if the money received is below the median per-capita liquidity received by all municipalities and they are
classified as “High” (column 2 and 4) otherwise. Columns 1 and 2 present raw results before the matching is
implemented. Columns 3 and 4 present results after the matching is realized. X coordinate and Y coordinate
geographically locate each municipality and represent the centroid of the 2-dimensional coordinates of each
municipality on a map in geospatial vector data format, population is the amount of people registered
in the census of the municipality, unemployment rate is the ratio of unemployed population to working
age population, employment rate is the ratio of employed population to working age population, fraction
of population aged 15-64 is the percentage of population aged 15-64, percentage PSOE, percentage PP
and percentage IU are the percentage of total votes received by PSOE, PP and IU in the 2011 municipal
elections, per-capita IAE, per-capita debt, per-capita revenue and per-capita expenditure measure the
municipal revenue from the IAE (tax on economic activities), the municipal debt, total municipal revenues
and total municipal expenditures normalized by working age population. Numbers reported are cross-
sectional averages and standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations appear in the last row.
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Table 3.14 Quality of the match in 2011 (Destination)
Low (U) High (U) Low (M) High (M)
X coordinate 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.48
(0.34) (0.31) (0.39) (0.31)
Y coordinate 4.47 4.41 4.41 4.41
(0.28) (0.28) (0.33) (0.28)
Population 7618.61 18179.21 11722.78 10204.00
(18973.31) (101352.04) (25756.65) (21109.32)
Unemployment rate 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Employment rate 0.42 0.46 0.44 0.44
(0.24) (0.29) (0.21) (0.21)
Fraction of population aged 15-64 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Percentage PSOE 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.34
(0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18)
Percentage PP 0.35 0.37 0.35 0.37
(0.22) (0.20) (0.22) (0.20)
Percentage IU 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
Per-capita IAE (EUR/N) 39.53 46.31 33.46 36.36
(148.81) (394.28) (81.33) (152.50)
Per-capita debt (EUR/N) 458.42 537.39 466.15 526.67
(504.28) (628.61) (462.50) (622.23)
Per-capita revenue (EUR/N) 1635.11 1687.43 1655.26 1686.30
(796.59) (968.81) (782.98) (972.89)
Per-capita expenditure (EUR/N) 1640.15 1701.24 1660.46 1696.27
(775.39) (937.32) (751.41) (933.42)
Observations 1703 1676 851 1605
This table reports summary statistics of municipality-year observations in 2011 for the entire sample. The
data is classified according to the destination of the funds, this is, according to the municipality where the
firms that receive the money have their headquarters. Municipalities are classified as “Low“ (column 1 and
3) if the money received is below the median per-capita liquidity received by all municipalities and they are
classified as “High” (column 2 and 4) otherwise. Columns 1 and 2 present raw results before the matching is
implemented. Columns 3 and 4 present results after the matching is realized. X coordinate and Y coordinate
geographically locate each municipality and represent the centroid of the 2-dimensional coordinates of each
municipality on a map in geospatial vector data format, population is the amount of people registered
in the census of the municipality, unemployment rate is the ratio of unemployed population to working
age population, employment rate is the ratio of employed population to working age population, fraction
of population aged 15-64 is the percentage of population aged 15-64, percentage PSOE, percentage PP
and percentage IU are the percentage of total votes received by PSOE, PP and IU in the 2011 municipal
elections, per-capita IAE, per-capita debt, per-capita revenue and per-capita expenditure measure the
municipal revenue from the IAE (tax on economic activities), the municipal debt, total municipal revenues
and total municipal expenditures normalized by working age population. Numbers reported are cross-
sectional averages and standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations appear in the last row.
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4 Do Cross-Listings substitute for
International Diversification?
4.1 Introduction
In the last three decades international equity positions in portfolio investment have
increased substantially. The demand from investors to increase the international
exposure of their portfolio has increased. At the same time, firms have opted to
increase their cross-listing in foreign markets as a way to broaden their investor base.
These changes in the relative demand and supply for cross-border investments raise
questions on the relative value from international portfolio diversification. What have
the effects of these two trends been on the net benefits from international portfolio
diversification? How have the relative values in terms of industry and country
diversification changed as a result of cross-listing by corporations?
This paper focuses on these questions which are of paramount importance for
optimal portfolio investment strategies. First, it provides a description of the evolution
of cross-listing in international financial markets over the last three decades. The
propensity to cross-list has increased over the last decades. Whereas in the 1980s there
were roughly 1,000 cross-listed firms, this figure rose to almost 11,000 in the 2000s. In
relative terms, cross-listed stocks, which represented less than 7% of total listed stocks
in the 1980s, accounted for over 17% of total listed stocks in the 2000s.
Second, our paper shows that the presence of cross-listings significantly changes
the relative gains from international portfolio diversification. There has been a long
literature examining the importance of industry and country sources of diversification
when looking at international portfolio allocation. On one end, this literature has
highlighted the prevalence of country shocks relative to industry shocks in
internationally diversified portfolios (e.g., Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994) and Griffin
and Karolyi (1998)). This prevalence implied that there were substantial benefits from
diversification across countries in a portfolio. On a different end of the spectrum, a
number of papers have highlighted that the gains from international diversification for
a US based investor could be essentially achieved by investing in available securities
traded in U.S. markets. For example, in a classical paper, Errunza et al. (1999) show
that a diversified portfolio of U.S. issued securities that included foreign firms listed in
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U.S. markets, international close-end funds, and U.S. multinationals essentially could
replicate a portfolio of international diversified securities.
This paper provides additional insights to integrate these different views on the
benefits from international portfolio diversification. The paper shows that the prevalence
of cross-listed firms has implied a shift in the relative role that industry and country
shocks play in an internationally diversified portfolio. We are the first to explore the
role of cross-listed securities in the literature on country and industry effects. By using
a more complete data set, we show that an internationally diversified portfolio with the
inclusion of cross-listed securities resulted in a significant decline in the size of country
shocks in the last decade as country shocks became less important than industry shocks.
The paper shows that this effect is mainly driven by the presence of cross-listed firms.
In an internationally diversified portfolio that does not include investment in cross-
listed securities, diversification across countries is more effective than across industries.
Including cross-listed securities lowers the importance of country effects and is therefore
an effective way to achieve international diversification.
Cross-listing may possibly be the indicator for many other factors, for example
size, the dominance of multinational business, etc. A complete characterization of all
possible driving forces in the international diversification process would require a
different empirical strategy in order to disentangle country effects from these
underlying forces. However, from the point of view of an investor who must decide
whether to diversify across countries or industries, these underlying reasons are
irrelevant and we therefore do not study them.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a short
literature review on the benefits from international portfolio diversification and the
sources for this diversification benefits identified in the literature. Section 3 describes
the data and provides evidence on the evolution of cross-listing among international
corporations, as well as the main determinants in identifying cross-listing patterns.
Section 4 provides the methodological approach to identify relative gains from
international portfolio diversification. Section 5 presents the empirical evidence on the
role of cross-listing firms in the sources of gains from international diversification and
Section 6 concludes.
4.2 Literature Review
After the intrinsic tradeoff between risk and return was formally settled by Markowitz
(1952), ways of reducing risk through diversification were extensively studied. Potential
gains from industrial and international portfolio diversification have been measured in
a large literature started by Grubel (1968) and Levy and Sarnat (1970). Heston and
Rouwenhorst (1994) showed that diversification across countries within an industry is a
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much more effective tool for risk reduction than industry diversification within a country
even in geographically concentrated and economically integrated regions such as Western
Europe. In this same line, Griffin and Karolyi (1998) confirmed this result for a broader
sample of countries that included emerging markets.
Following Rouwenhorst (1999), a series of researchers including Baca et al. (2000),
Ferreira et al. (2005), Campa and Fernandes (2006) and Faias and Ferreira (2015) have
analyzed the evolution of country and industry factors and have concluded that
industry factors have been growing in importance and may now dominate country
factors. However, Brooks and Del Negro (2004) and Soriano and Climent (2006) argue
that this may have been just a temporary phenomenon associated with the stock
market bubble at the beginning of the century.
More recently, a number of authors have used different methodologies with mixed
results on the relative importance of country and industry factors. Thus, the debate
is still open. Phylaktis and Xia (2006), Baele and Inghelbrecht (2009) and Bekaert
et al. (2009) have found that geographical diversification continues to be superior to
industry diversification, while Bai and Green (2010) and Eiling et al. (2012) stated that
international equity returns are mainly driven by industry factors. Moreover, Chen
et al. (2006) and Christoffersen et al. (2012) have argued that there has been a decline
of the benefits from international diversification over time, and showed that emerging
markets offer greater diversification benefits than developed markets. A wide variety
of adaptations to the methodology of Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994) and alternative
models have been suggested. Because the model by Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994)
is widely used by practitioners, and also the conventional workhorse of the analysis of
country and industry effects, we restrict our analysis to their methodology.
Another strand of the literature has argued that investors can effectively diversify
across countries with instruments available in their home markets. Errunza et al.
(1999) tested this hypothesis and found that home-made diversification through
investment in multinational corporation stocks, closed-end country funds, and
American Depositary Receipts essentially exhausts gains from international
diversification. Moreover, they claim that incremental gains from international
diversification beyond home-made diversification portfolios have diminished over time
in a way consistent with changes in investment barriers. Rowland and Tesar (2004)
also showed that multinational corporations, which are usually included in the
literature on industry vs country effects, have provided diversification benefits for
investors.
A number of recent articles have argued that home bias and investor’s preferences
for home-stocks may limit the effectiveness of the diversification benefits highlighted by
Errunza et al. (1999). Portes and Rey (2005) showed that investors prefer the stocks of
foreign countries that are closer and Chan et al. (2005) showed that investors prefer
the stocks of foreign countries whose equity markets are more, not less, correlated with
their own. Moreover, the decision of where to cross-list may itself limit the
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effectiveness of international diversification. Sarkissian and Schill (2004) argued that
geographic, cultural, and industrial proximity are the main determinants of choosing
where to cross list. They found that contrary to the notion that firms maximize
international portfolio diversification gains in listing abroad, cross-listing activity is
more common across markets for which diversification gains are relatively low. The
main finding in this paper, that adding cross-listed firms reduces international portfolio
diversification gains, contrasts with this view.
4.3 The Phenomenon of Cross-Listing
Equity cross-listing by firms has increased over time. The prevalence of cross listing
differs by country of origin and firms are most likely to cross-list in relatively large
financial markets close to their home base. To grasp the full extent of the cross-listing
phenomenon, and to consider the whole universe of alternative stocks available to an
investor: we evaluate the largest possible set of information. We focus our analysis on
the information available in Global Index data. This database is used by virtually all
of the academic literature. This provides the added benefit of comparability relative to
previous work. We use a dataset covering the entire menu of alternative stocks in which
an investor can invest.1
We focus our analysis on firm level data and include all stocks listed in a particular
country. The use of firm level data allows the inclusion of firms with relative small
market capitalization that are usually excluded from the reported country and industry
indexes that have been usually used in the previous literature.
Bai and Green (2010) argue that the use of data on individual stocks is preferable
to using indices because indices have several limitations: first, investment managers
buy individual shares and not indices, and second, weighting and composition of indices
change over time in a manner that does not necessarily reflect underlying market trends.
We follow their lead and use individual stocks as our unit of analysis.
All data are monthly and in US dollars, expressed at the current exchange rate.
The return data that we use are monthly total return indices and market capitalizations
for each firm. Total return indices represent the theoretical growth in value of holding
a stock over a month, assuming that dividends and other payments are re-invested to
purchase additional units of equity and correcting for stock splits. The dataset used in
this paper covers stocks traded in 42 countries, 22 developed and 20 emerging markets,
over three decades (from December 1979 to December 2009). Stocks traded in these 42
national markets can belong to either domestic firms based in each of these countries
1The data comes from Datastream. We use research lists. These lists include all stocks listed in
a particular country and do not a priori exclude stocks based on certain criteria, such as market
capitalization.
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or to foreign firms cross-listed in those markets. The origin of cross-listed firms may be
from countries other than the 42 that we consider. In total, in our data set we have
identified 97 different countries of origin of the cross-listed firms.
Table 1 shows the prevalence of cross-listed firms in each country and the prevalence
of these observations over time. The first column lists the 42 countries in our data. The
following six columns show the number of firms in each country that are cross-listed
and the total of listed firms by period. Two salient features arise from these data.
First, cross-listing has become more important over time. Both the number and the
percentage of cross-listed firms have been increasing. In the 1980s there were 1,026
cross-listed firms (6.7% of the total) and by the 2000s this number had risen to 10,994
(17.2% of the total). Second, cross-listing is much more concentrated in a few countries.
Large developed countries (US, Great Britain, Germany) and small countries with large
financial centers (Hong Kong, Singapore) account for the vast majority of cross-listings in
the sample. However, the concentration of cross listings has not changed monotonically
over time. For example, the C3 concentration ratio stood at 64% in the 1980s, dropped
to 52% in the 1990s, and increased to 72% in the 2000s.2 For the C5 concentration ratio,
the numbers were 85% in the 1980s, 72% in the 1990s, and 86% in the 2000s. In the
2000s, Germany becomes the second largest destination for cross-listings. Switzerland
also attracts a greater number of cross-listed stocks. On the other hand, cross-listings
in France and Singapore do not grow as much.
The last six columns list the number of observations in our database. An observation
in these columns is a firm-month pair. Cross-listing has become more stable over time.
In the 1980s there were countries with a relative large number of cross-listed firms that
did not remain in the sample for very long. The persistence of cross-listed firms in the
latter part of the sample is larger. Therefore, the correlation coefficient between the
number of firms and the number of observations rises from around 0.92 in the 1980s and
1990s to over 0.96 in the 2000s.3
Table 2 shows the origin of firms cross-listed in our 42 markets. We have grouped
the 97 originating countries that appear in the data into regions. Most of the cross-listed
firms originate from the Americas and Europe. Within those continents, North America
and Western and Northern Europe have the largest share of firms. The Caribbean is
over-represented, presumably because of tax benefits.
We classify firms according to their primary activity. We use Datastream
Industrial Classification Levels, which is analogous to the Industry Classification
Benchmark developed by FTSE.4 We group firms according to their industry
2Concentration ratio C“n” is calculated by adding the number of cross-listed firms in the “n” countries
with more cross-listed firms and dividing by the total number of cross-listed firms.
3This correlation coefficient is calculated per period, using the number of cross-listed firms and the
number of cross-listed observations as the two arrays.
4All firms that do not have an industrial classification are dropped. Moreover, those firms that belong
to the “Unquoted Equity Classification” are also dropped.
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classification into 35 groups, so that the number of industries roughly coincides with
the number of countries. Griffin and Karolyi (1998) argue that the number of countries
and industries must be similar to more accurately measure the country and industry
effects.5
In the first column of Table 3 we observe the 35 industries used in the paper.
The next 3 columns show the ratio of total market value of cross-listings over total
market value of listed companies (both cross-listings and non-cross-listings). The last six
columns present the number of firms that are cross-listed and the total number of firms
(both cross-listed and non-cross-listed) by industry, for the three decades considered.
In the last row of Table 3 we observe that cross-listings are not only increasing in
number (right of the table) but also their relative market value weight is also increasing
(left of the table). This is evidence that the propensity to cross-list has increased not
only in terms of the number of firms, but also in their relative weight with respect
to total listed firms. As we observe, this increase is practically homogeneous among
all industries, although some industries, such as general industrials, have permanently
had a large weight of cross-listings. The large fraction of market value accounted for by
cross-listed firms implies that investors can easily invest in each industry, and potentially
diversify across industries, using cross-listed firms.
In Table 4 we look at mean returns, standard deviations and Sharpe ratios for
country portfolios of value weighted local stocks and cross-listed firms. If cross-listing
provides diversification benefits, then equilibrium expected returns could be lower for
cross-listed firms. In fact, we observe that all countries with a high number of
cross-listings (see Table 1), such as USA, Great Britain, Germany, Hong Kong or
Singapore, have a lower Sharpe Ratio for their cross-listings than for the
non-cross-listings. Therefore, the evidence is broadly consistent with the existence of a
diversification premium.
4.4 Methodology
We have characterized the nature of the cross-listing phenomenon. Now we move on
to study whether cross-listings have an impact on diversification possibilities. We do
so in the context of the ubiquitous Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994) framework. In this
framework it is assumed that returns depend on a global market factor and industry
and country factors. Specifically, the return of the ith security that belongs to industry
j and country k can be decomposed as:
5As we explain below, although the total number of countries is 42, not all countries have data at each
date, so that on average the effective number of countries is close to 35 in our regressions.
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Rijk(t) = α(t) + βj(t) + γk(t) + εijk(t) (4.1)
where Rijk(t) is the total return index of firm i that belongs to industry j and country k
in month t, α(t) is the base level return in period t, βj(t) is the industry factor in month
t, γk(t) is the country factor in month t and εijk(t) represents idiosyncratic unobserved
heterogeneity.
For each month t, we estimate the common factor α(t), the industry factor βj(t),
and the country factor γk(t) using a cross-sectional regression of all firms on country
and industry dummies:
Rijk = α + β1I1 + β2I2 + ...+ β35I35 + γ1C1 + γ2C2 + ...+ γ42C42 + εijk (4.2)
Again, Rijk is the total return index of firm i that belongs to industry j and country
k, βj and γk are the industry and country pure effects, I and C are the industry and
country dummies which take value one if firm i belongs to that industry and country, or
take value zero otherwise. All cross sectional regressions are estimated through weighted
least squares.
As is well known, when using dummy variables as regressors it is not possible to
identify the effects of the dummies (industry and country in our case) if all the dummies
in each category (one dummy for each industry and one dummy for each country) are
included, because of perfect multicollinearity between the regressors. There are several
ways of dealing with this issue. One practice is to exclude one industry and one country
in the regression. The estimated coefficients are then interpreted as the industry and
country effects relative to the industry and country excluded. The solution favored in the
literature (Campa and Fernandes (2006); Bekaert et al. (2009)) on country and industry
effects is to add two additional restrictions, one for industries and one for countries,
to remove the redundant degrees of freedom. This is, in fact, the procedure we will
follow in this paper; we add the following two linear constraints:
∑35
j=1 ω
i
j,tβj,t = 0 and∑42
k=1 ω
i
k,tγk,t = 0, where ω
i
j,t and ω
i
k,t are the weights of industry j, and country k, in the
world market portfolio at month t. In this way, the weighted sum of the pure industry
and country effects add up to zero, and the intercept α is interpreted as the return on
the value-weighted world market return at t. A country pure effect γk is the excess
return of a portfolio of country k that is free of incremental industrial effects. Likewise,
an industry pure effect βj is the excess return of a portfolio of industry j that is free of
incremental country effects.
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4.4.1 MADs
For each period t, we obtain estimated coefficients for the industry and country effects
from the cross-sectional regressions previously described. In order to compare industry
and country effects, we use the monthly time series of the coefficients obtained and
follow Rouwenhorst (1999) to construct mean absolute deviation (MAD) measures:
MADβ(t) =
∑35
j=1 ωj|βjt | and MADγ(t) =
∑42
k=1 ωk|γkt | where ωj and ωk are the
industry and country weights respectively, and |βjt | and |γkt | are the absolute industry
and country effects in month t. The MADβ(t) measures the weighted mean absolute
deviation industry effects, and the MADγ(t)| measures the weighted mean absolute
deviation country effects. This measure gauges the importance of the pure industry
and country effects and serves as a dispersion measure. The higher the MADs, the
higher the dispersion of the weighted absolute estimated coefficients, and thus the
more disperse are the industry/country returns around the world in that period. For
all our figures, we plot 23-month moving averages of the monthly weighted absolute
values of the industry and country effects.
4.4.2 Sample selection
In our analysis, the number of countries does not remain constant through time. We
have tried to replicate the universe of investment possibilities available to the typical
investor. As new countries appear, international investors are able to diversify over
a larger set of countries. Nevertheless, for a given period, if there are less than 35
firms listed in a country, these firms are dropped from the regressions, and therefore the
country will not be part of the analysis. This adjustment is not necessary in the industry
sectors because the industrial classification levels have been adjusted to have enough
firms per level. The reason for excluding countries with a low number of observations
is twofold. First, a minimum number of observations is necessary to accurately identify
the coefficient econometrically. Second, from the perspective of an investor, the number
of firms in a market is negatively correlated with the ability and easiness to invest in
frontier markets. In any case, value weighting will reduce the importance of this issue.
At the same time, country MADs will pick up country effects for these time-changing
investment possibilities. We have conducted a number of robustness exercises in which
we restrict the number of countries to those that were available at given moments of
time.6
6Results are available upon request.
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4.5 Results
4.5.1 The relative importance of industry and country effects
We use the same empirical approach throughout all this section but we gradually vary
our sample by including cross-listings. In our first approach, following what has been
done in the literature, we omit cross-listings from our sample, both in the regressions
and in the calculation of the MADs. At each date we use all available countries. When
observations of cross-listed firms are excluded from the sample, country factors dominate
industry factors, except for the period of the stock market bubble. In Figure 1 we plot 23-
month moving averages of industry and country MADs. As documented by Brooks and
Del Negro (2004) and Soriano and Climent (2006), industry MADs temporarily exceed
country MADs around the year 2000 due to the stock market dot-com bubble and crash.
Consistent with their findings, in our data, it is the industries of software and computer
services, technology hardware and equipment, and telecommunications that exhibit the
largest coefficients during this period. More generally, the picture qualitatively resembles
the findings of the previous literature, indicating that our sample and methodology are
overall comparable. In the last years of the sample country effects have regained their
importance and are above industry effects.
The evidence changes drastically once cross-listed firms are included in the sample.
The relative importance of pure country effects is reduced. In Figure 2 country MADs
diminish whereas industry MADs are barely affected. In the last years of our sample,
industry and country effects are roughly equalized. Because countries that are late
entrants into the sample are emerging markets, country effects are given a boost.
A comment on a subtle point is in order. As we have seen in Table IV for markets
with a high prevalence of cross-listed firms, cross-listed stocks have a high variance
relative to domestic stocks. These countries (US, Great Britain, Germany, Hong Kong,
and Singapore) do also represent a large fraction of world market value. Because these
markets will carry a large weight in the regressions and construction of MADs, it could
be expected that the inclusion of cross-listed firms might mechanically increase country
MADs. However, we have found that the inclusion of cross-listed firms reduces country
MADs. This implies that the drop in country effects due to increased diversification
benefits is particularly strong, given that it overcomes the mechanical effect due to
differential variances.
By incorporating cross-listings in the regressions and in the MADs there are
basically two distinct phenomena that make country effects decrease. When the
weights of the MADs are calculated including cross-listings, more globally integrated
countries (that have more cross-listings) increase their weights and consequently
country effects decrease. This is because, as we noted before, cross-listings are defined
at the country where they are listed, not at the country of origin. The second
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phenomenon arises by the self-selection of firms that chose to become cross-listed. As
shown in Section 3, more globally integrated firms have a higher propensity to
cross-list. Therefore, when including cross-listings in the regressions, country effects
are likely to decrease. In order to disentangle these two effects, we examine MADs
estimated in the sample without cross-listed stocks re-weighted using market values of
the sample that includes cross-listings. The results of this exercise are shown in Figure
3. We observe that country effects decrease slightly relative to Figure 1, but still
dominate industry effects.
The result from this exercise suggests that the factor driving the reduction of
country effects is truly an increase in the benefits of international diversification and
that it is not simply due to the rebalancing of global market value to venues in which
cross-listed firms are relatively abundant.
4.5.2 Understanding the effect of cross-listings on country effects
What is the effect of cross-listed stocks on country effects? What is the marginal
contribution of cross-listed stocks on country effects? To answer this question we use a
more flexible specification to break the constraint imposed in equation 1 that
cross-listed and purely domestic stocks should command the same country effect.
Specifically, the return of a stock in country k can have a different effect depending on
whether the stock is cross-listed or not. Whereas the return of a stock that is not
cross-listed is similar to equation 1, the return of a cross-listed stock has a country
effect γCk L that is potentially different from the country effect for domestic stocks γ
D
k .
For cross-listed stocks: Rijk(t) = α(t) + β
D
j (t) + εijk(t) if it is not cross-listed, and
Rijk(t) = α(t) + β
CL
j (t) + εijk(t) if it is cross-listed.
In terms of the estimation, this amounts to adding interaction terms between
country dummies and a dummy indicating whether a particular stock is cross-listed.
Rijk =α + β1I1 + β2I2 + ...+ β35I35 + γ1C1 + γ2C2 + ...+ γ42C42
+ ρ1C1S + ρ2C2S + ...+ ρ42C42S + εijk (4.3)
Again, Rijk is the total return index of firm i that belongs to industry j and country
k, βj, γk and ρk are the industry, country and cross-listing pure effects, I and C are the
industry and country dummies which take value one if firm i belongs to that industry
and country, or take value zero otherwise. S is a dummy which takes value one if firm i
is cross-listed, or takes value zero otherwise.7
The pure country effect attributable to non-cross-listed stocks is directly given by
the estimate of γDk . On the other hand, the pure country effect attributable to cross-
7To avoid sample size bias, we require that there are at least 4 cross-listed firms in a country in a
given period.
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listed firms can be calculated as the sum of the domestic country effect and the coefficient
on the interaction term: γCLk = γ
D
k + ρk.
The correlation of γDk with γ
CL
k measures the relationship between the country
effects attributable to domestic and cross-listed stocks. If this correlation is close to
one, then the country effect of domestic and cross-listed stocks moves in lock-step. On
the other hand, a decreasing correlation indicates a decoupling of the country effects of
domestic and cross-listed stocks. Cross-listed securities become more different from their
domestic counterparts. This suggests that they are more useful for diversification. From
Figure 4 it is apparent that cross-sectional correlation of γDk and γ
CL
k has decreased over
time, in particular in the period after the mid-1990s. At the beginning of our sample,
domestic and cross-listed stocks had a country effect that tended to move in lock-step
whereas, in the latter period, this strong relationship starts to break down.
The wedge between γDk and γ
CL
k is given by ρk ≡ γCLk − γDk . In the data the
correlation between the estimates of γDk and the estimates of ρk across countries is
negative and becomes increasingly negative over time. This indicates that a stock’s
country effect is counteracted by values of ρk that are of the opposite sign in the case
of cross-listed firms. In other words, the country effect of cross-listed firms is a muted
version of the country effect of domestic stocks, implying that cross-listed stocks are
more similar to the world market portfolio (α). This evidence reinforces the conclusion
that cross-listed stocks are effective to diversify across countries.
4.6 Conclusion
We provide evidence of the rise of cross-listings in world financial markets. This fact
cannot be eluded by investors, because it has an effect on the risk management of equity
portfolios. The literature on country and industry effects has not explored the effects
of international diversification through home investment through the use of cross-listed
stocks. By using a more complete dataset, which includes cross-listings, we find that the
relative importance of industry and country effects depends heavily on the inclusion of
cross-listings.
Echoing the findings by Errunza et al. (1999), we find that industry effects have
become a more effective tool for risk reduction over time relative to country effects.
In the 1980s we do not find an important effect of the cross-listings on the country
and industry effects relationship, but from the 1990s onward, industry effects gain in
importance relative to country effects. This shift in importance is mainly driven by the
presence of cross-listed firms since we show that an internationally diversified portfolio
that does not include cross-listed securities still has the characteristics that country
shocks dominate industry effects.
Most academic research on the importance of industry and country effects has
implicitly disregarded cross-listed securities by using databases in which they are not
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included. Given that they are available to the investment community, the question of
how they affect diversification possibilities has practical relevance. So far, the evidence
suggests that international diversification is becoming less important than diversification
across industries.
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4.7 Figures and Tables
Table 4.1 Summary statistics by country.
Notes: This table reports time series averages of the number of listed firms and cross-listed firms and
of the number of observations by country for every decade for the period January 1980 to December
2009.
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Table 4.2 Summary statistics by region of origin.
Notes: This table reports time series averages of the number
of cross-listed firms by region of origin for every decade, for
the period January 1980 to December 2009.
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Table 4.3 Summary statistics by industry.
Notes: This table reports time series averages of the market value of cross-listings as a percentage of
total market capitalization and of the number of listed firms and cross-listed firms, by industry, for every
decade for the period January 1980 to December 2009. The fraction of the market value by cross-listed
firms is calculated as MV(CL)/MV(TOTAL) = total market value of cross-listings / (total market value
of cross-listings + total market value of non-cross-listings) by industry. Total market value is calculated
adding the market value of every firm-month observation. AVERAGE/TOTAL calculates the average
for the first three columns and the total for the last six columns.
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Table 4.4 Summary statistics for value weighted portfolios of country returns for local firms
and cross-listed firms.
Notes: Mean, standard deviation and Sharpe ratios for value weighted portfolios of country returns
for local firms and cross-listed firms. Mean value-weighted returns are obtained by value-averaging
firm-month returns for each country for every month, and then averaging for each country for all dates.
Value-weighted standard deviations are obtained by calculating standard deviations of firm returns for
each country for every month, and then for each country averaging the resulting standard deviations for
all dates. Sharpe ratio is the inverse of the coefficient of variation. It is used as a proxy to measure risk
adjusted return. Due to limited sample size we do not show results for countries with few cross-listings
(see Table I).
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Figure 4.1 Pure Country and Industry Effects (23 month moving average). No cross-listings.
Notes: MADs (mean absolute deviation measures) are calculated following the methodology explained
in Section 4. We plot 23-moth moving averages of the monthly weighted absolute values of the industry
(red discontinuous line) and country (blue continuous line) effects. Cross-listed firms are not included
in this analysis at any stage.
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Figure 4.2 Pure Country and Industry Effects (23 month moving average). Cross-listings
are included to calculate the weights in the MADs and in the regressions.
Notes: MADs (mean absolute deviation measures) are calculated following the methodology explained
in Section 4. We plot 23-moth moving averages of the monthly weighted absolute values of the industry
(red discontinuous line) and country (blue continuous line) effects. Cross-listed firms are included to
calculate the weights of the MADs and in the regressions.
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Figure 4.3 Pure Country and Industry Effects (23 month moving average). Cross-listings
are included to calculate the weights in the MADs but not in the regressions.
Notes: MADs (mean absolute deviation measures) are calculated following the methodology explained
in Section 4. We plot 23-moth moving averages of the monthly weighted absolute values of the industry
(red discontinuous line) and country (blue continuous line) effects. Cross-listed firms are included to
calculate the weights of the MADs but are not included in the regressions.
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Figure 4.4 Correlation between γDk and γ
CL
k (23 month moving average).
Notes: Correlation between γDk (pure country effect attributable to non-cross-listed stocks) and γ
CL
k
(pure country effect attributable to cross-listed stocks) over time. The construction of γDk and γ
CL
k is
explained in Section 5.
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